

# COMMAND AND CONTROL: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES FOR JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-40

## Introduction

1. In his book *'Low Intensity Operations'<sup>1</sup>*, Kitson underscores the critical importance of 'tying military and civil effort together' in order to produce 'unified planning, centralised control and a single point of responsibility'. This Annex contains five studies that describe and summarise the civil-military coordination arrangements adopted in a number of different security and stabilisation contexts in which British armed forces have been involved since 1948. Three of them are historical: Malaya, Oman, and Northern Ireland, and have been written with the benefit of hindsight. The final two attempt to capture and describe contemporary coordination arrangements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Clearly what is described in these studies is very much 'work in progress', and only in the fullness of time will it be possible to gain an holistic overview of the arrangements that predominated in these 2 theatres.
2. To assist the reader, the structure of each study is broadly similar. By way of background and of setting the context of the operational theatre, each one provides an overview of the specific campaign which it addresses, and then goes on to describe the prevailing arrangements that enabled civil-military cooperation to take place. To widen the scope, they also consider the arrangements adopted that enabled the host nation government to exert its influence in the context of the campaign.

## Purpose

3. The purpose of this overview is to allow the reader to compare and contrast different approaches that sought to 'operationalise' that which is described in contemporary language as a comprehensive approach. This comparison should help a commander to better understand the issues when considering the design of his own arrangements when faced with a similar task, (albeit within a distinctly different context).

## Enduring Attributes

4. Civil-Military Command and Control Arrangements:
  - Appointment of single authority at the strategic level.
  - Shared political-military vision of the desired end-state.
  - Cooperative planning generating a single campaign plan.

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 3, page 53 *et seq.* reprinted Redwood and Burn Limited, 1975, ISBN 0 571 09801 0.

- Coherent coordination arrangements that flow from the strategic to the tactical levels.
- Shared intelligence and information management.
- Political and military chains of command organised to deliver unity of effect (shared outcomes).

5. Extending Host Nation Government Influence:

- Indigenous involvement in planning and execution.
- Coherent strategic messaging and information strategy.
- Inter-agency investment in capacity building.

## **CIVIL-MILITARY THEATRE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS – STUDY 1**

### **THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948 - 1960**

*“Dear Lyttelton, Malaya, we must have a plan.  
Secondly, we must have a man.  
When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.  
Yours sincerely, Montgomery (F.M.)”*

Letter sent by Field Marshall Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the then Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, 23 December 1951.

#### **Outline of the Campaign**

6. The Malayan Emergency was a guerrilla war, albeit with very specific political over-tones, fought between British and Commonwealth forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army, the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), from 1948 to 1960. The term *‘Emergency’* was the colonial government’s preferred descriptor for the conflict as, had it been described as a ‘war’, economic losses suffered by the rubber and tin concessions would not have been covered by their insurers, Lloyds of London.

7. The Emergency lasted for more than 12 years and, with the benefit of hind-sight, it can be characterised as falling into three distinct phases. The first phase began in 1947 with the gradual unravelling of the political status quo, and ran to the inception of the Briggs Plan on 1 June 1950. Following the forcible removal of the Japanese at the end of the Second World War, the re-establishment of British administration brought with it the renewed hope of independence for Malaya. In particular, the MCP, who had fought with British assistance and weapons to eject the Japanese, had hoped to influence the British to establish an independent state with a socialist-type ‘People’s Government’ at its helm. As it gradually became clear to them that the British had no

intentions of allowing such a course of action, the MCP adopted an increasingly violent policy of social destabilisation through civil unrest, strikes, and eventually, armed uprisings and acts of terrorism. A state of emergency was declared in June 1948. Caught short by the suddenness and scope of the outbreak, the British introduced the Briggs Plan which enabled them to regain control of the situation.

8. Named after its primary author, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, the Briggs Plan was introduced in June 1950 shortly after his appointment as Director of Military Operations. Its introduction marked the start of the successful second phase of the Emergency. The plan aimed to defeat the Malayan communists, who were operating out of rural areas as a guerrilla army, primarily by cutting them off from their sources of support amongst the population. To this end, a massive program of forced resettlement of Malay peasantry<sup>2</sup> was undertaken, under which about 500,000 people (roughly ten percent of Malaya's population) were eventually removed from the land and interned in guarded camps called 'New Villages'.

**The Briggs Plan**

To establish proper administrative control in Malaya, the plan called for:

- rapid resettlement of squatters under surveillance of police and auxiliary police
- regrouping local labor in mines and on estates
- recruitment and training of criminal investigation and special branch personnel
- a minimum level of troops throughout the country to support police and concentrate forces for clearing priority areas
- police and army operating in complete accord, with joint operational control on all levels and close integration of police and military intelligence.

It went into effect on June 1, 1950, and created state and district war executive committees (SWEC and DWEC) whose members made joint decisions and issued orders to subordinates through service chains of command to ensure complete integration of actions to support the civil power at all times

The Briggs Plan was intended to be thorough and long-term, with no expectation of speedy and decisive results. It envisaged clearing the country from south to north, leaving behind strong police and civil authorities once an area was secure. It also sought to isolate insurgents from rural populations to enable them to come forward with information. Moreover, it aimed at depriving the communists support and forcing them into the open to be dealt with by the security forces.

Source: *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* (Federation of Malaya, 1958), p. III-5-6.

9. In October 1951, the then British High Commissioner was ambushed and shot dead by terrorists, prompting Montgomery's letter (quoted at the start of this piece) to the Colonial Secretary. In January 1952, Lyttelton appointed Lt Gen Sir Gerald

<sup>2</sup> Often referred to as 'squatters', these were, in the main, ethnic Chinese who were re-settled and given title deeds to land. This process gave them a stake in ensuring a peaceful outcome to the Emergency, not least because ownership of land brought them economic benefit, but it also ran contrary to the communist ideals being peddled by the MCP.

Templar in his stead, and it was he who forced through and oversaw the full implementation of the Briggs Plan. What made it easier for him was, with Briggs' departure from Malaya, Templar combined the posts of High Commissioner and DMO, thereby vesting full civil-military authority in one person. Although Briggs had laid the foundations for the conduct of successful military operations, it was Templar who created the right political climate within which they could properly take effect. Although the combined position of High Commissioner and DMO was once again split on Templar's departure in 1954, civil-military relations had evolved and matured sufficiently that this separation had no adverse effect.

10. The final phase of the Emergency continued after Malayan Independence in 1957, and lasted until 1960 when the final pockets of communist guerrillas were cleared from areas near the Thai border. This phase was overseen by Sir Robert Thompson, the Permanent Minister of Defence for Malaya. Based on his observations and experiences in Malaya, in 1961 Thompson was offered by the Macmillan government to the US as the head of a civil-military advisory board known as BRIAM (British Advisory Mission) to South Vietnam.

### **Civil-Military C2 Arrangements**


11. As previously stated, Templar is credited with establishing the right civil-military context in which a well constructed plan could be delivered. His famous maxim for establishing the context was: *'Get the priorities right; Get the instructions right; Get the organisation right; Get the right people into the organisation; Get the right spirit into the people, and; Let them get on with it.'*<sup>3</sup> The following diagram<sup>4</sup> illustrates the civil-military C2 arrangements that were instigated under the Briggs Plan, and subsequently refined by Templar using the elements of his maxim.

12. It should be noted that, at the time, Malaya was a federation of states, each of which had a British advisor to assist in the direction of the counter insurgency and the move towards independence. The decisions of the Executive Council taken at the seat of government were reflected at state and district level through the establishment of State and District War Executive Committees (SWECs and DWECs – of which there were 11 and 60 respectively). These had a senior political administrator (chief minister or district officer), senior police officer, the senior military commander, the senior Home Guard<sup>5</sup> officer, an information officer, and others as required.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Chapter 5, page 90. John A. Nagl, University of Chicago Press paperback edition 2005.

<sup>4</sup> See *Civil-Military Operations – Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergency* by Joel E. Hamby (Major, US Army) in Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 2002 at [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/jfq\\_pages/1132.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/jfq_pages/1132.pdf) accessed on 02 Feb 09.

<sup>5</sup> The Home Guard were local militia raised ostensibly to guard the 'New Villages'. They finally numbered some 1.25 million by the end of the Emergency, and were subsequently disbanded.



Source: Riley Sunderland, *Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya: 1947-1960*, RM-4171-ISA, prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, September 1964), p. 34.

### Enabling Host Nation Government

13. The generic composition and responsibilities of the SWEC and DWEC was as follows:

Component	SWEC	DWEC	Responsibilities
<b>CIVIL</b>	- State Prime Minister - Executive Secretary - Information Officer	- District Officer - Information Officer	Local government affairs. Public relations and PSYOPS.
<b>POLICE</b>	- Chief Police Officer - Head, Special Branch - Home Guard Officer	- Police Commander - Special Branch Officer - Home Guard Officer	All police ops and police intelligence. Coord of Home Guard activities.
<b>MILITARY</b>	- Brigade Commander - Military Intelligence Officer	- Battalion Commander - Military Intelligence Officer	All military ops and military intelligence.

14. This committee approach ensured that the joint civil-police-military construct that was established at the strategic level in Kuala Lumpur was fully reflected and harmonised with the decision making apparatus at the lower levels. Thus State and District WECs carried out the policies established at the federal level by the High Commissioner and the Director of Military Operations. This kind and level of integration was essential to ensure that the security forces acted in support of the Government, and that independent chains of command did not function at cross-purposes. In addition, community leaders, local planters, tin miners and other invited specialists occasionally attended these regular meetings.

## **CIVIL-MILITARY THEATRE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS – STUDY 2**

### **OMAN, 1965-1975**

#### **Outline of the Campaign**

15. 1962 saw the beginning of a minor rebellion in the southern Omani region of Dhofar. Dissidents went on to formalise their existence, naming themselves the Dhofar Liberation Front. The 1967 British withdrawal from Aden saw the creation of the Marxist-communist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, from which Russian and Chinese support then flowed into south-west Oman and the Dhofar Liberation Front. With the standard Communist framework organisation for rebellion in place, the Dhofar Liberation Front became a fully fledged revolutionary front, and changed its name to The People's Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), changing to People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in 1974. The Sultan's Armed Forces struggled to contain the insurgency, which flourished in the classical revolutionary environment of a secure base, good natural cover and plenty of support from the civilian population maintained through tribal links or coercion.

#### **Civil-Military Command and Control Arrangements**

16. In July 1970 the ruling Sultan, Said Bin Taimur, was ousted in a bloodless coup by his son, Sultan Qaboos. The new Sultan immediately enacted a series of governmental reforms, enabled by the inflow of oil revenues. These also funded a greater investment in defence, in recognition that a far larger and more capable national security force was needed if the war was to have a successful outcome. The Sultan exercised absolute authority as Commander-in-Chief, however, the position of Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces (CSAF) was occupied by a British Major General. This arrangement had been in place since 1959, and the CSAF reported to the Omani Deputy Defence Minister, himself a member of the ruling family. Additionally, the Sultan engaged the services of other officers and servicemen from various friendly countries. Most were from Britain, but some also came from Jordan, Iran, India and Pakistan. This C2 arrangement meant that there was demonstrable host

nation ownership of the problem, and those that were in support of the host nation were drawn from like-minded, trusted and respected allies. An additional advantage of this approach was the depth of understanding<sup>6</sup>, at the highest levels of command, of the Dhofar region and its people, and therefore the implications of political or military decisions were implicitly understood.

17. All SAF in Dhofar came under the command of Headquarters Dhofar Brigade which, in effect, had an indigenous command structure, supplemented by foreigners on loan service or contract. The Brigade was a joint, multi-national force comprising some 10,000 all ranks. In many aspects, it was remarkably like a modern Combined Joint Task Force. Critically, control of the campaign and orchestration of the military, civil and intelligence efforts was vested in a committee – the Dhofar Development Committee (DDC). This met on a weekly basis under the chairmanship of the Wali, Sheikh Braik. This Committee had evolved along lines similar to those used for the same purpose in the Malayan Emergency, where the military instrument was subjugated to the Civil Power, and similar committees were present down to district level. Typically, these committees comprised the principal civil and military authorities, and the DDC included the Wali, the Brigade Commander, the local Head of the Development Department (who also acted as Secretary), the Town Clerk, the Head of Intelligence, the Head of the Civil Aid Department and, later, the Chief Police Officer. Policy matters were discussed and decisions promulgated at once. This proved a successful format for management under wartime conditions whilst the Omani government departments were in their infancy and unaccustomed to accepting responsibility for decisions. The mix of personalities and experience were often key factors in the running of the committees; the first action of the incoming Brigade Commander in 1974 being key leader engagement, meeting the Wali.

18. The mission of the Dhofar Brigade was ‘to secure Dhofar for civil development’. The ability to capitalise on security with the immediate conduct of development activities was recognised as the critical linkage. Crucial to enabling this was the Civil Aid Department. This Department had been established to ensure that there was concurrent planning for long-term development which was to take place in the wake of military operations to secure or liberate an area. The idea was to ensure that development effort followed closely behind security operations, and this was conducted by Civil Action Teams. Based on the assessed need, these Teams would provide fledgling ‘Government Centres’ which could include, for example a shop, a school, a medical clinic, and in some cases, even a mosque.

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<sup>6</sup> Sultan Said Taimur had married a Dhofari woman and in latter years had spent most of his time in the region, rather than in his capital.

## Command and Control of Special Forces

19. Unlike previous Special Air Service (SAS) operations in Oman during the late 1950s, in the Dhofar campaign, they were part of the Dhofar Brigade. Their activities were coordinated through the euphemistically-named British Army Training Team (BATT); in essence a SAS Squadron with specific tasks and capabilities. Whilst they were responsible for raising tribal militias (known as *firqats*) and training indigenous Dhofari to fight for the Sultan, they also conducted more traditional special forces activities. The development of the *firqats* took place over three phases. Firstly, there was the process of recruiting and training which largely entailed sorting out tribal problems and establishing the *firqat* leadership. Once they had been formed and trained, *firqats* entered the main operational cycle alongside other SAF units. They were initially supported by embeds and mentors, and a typical task would be to establish themselves in the tribal areas, clearing them of enemy. The final step of their development was to instil in them the ability to initiate development activity and to work with the Civil Aid Department. Once the SAF and *firqat* had reached sufficient levels of capability, the BATT mission evolved into one of engagement with the local population. For this, their structure also changed, and they worked in smaller teams which consisted of an intelligence element, a psychological (PSYOPS)/information element, a medic and a veterinary officer. The Commanding Officer of SAS at the time acknowledged that these were short-term expedient measures; stop gaps until the Omanis could undertake these tasks themselves.

## Extending Host Nation Government Influence

20. Over time, a distinct pattern of activity emerged, roughly along the following lines:

- A SAF operation, supported by *firqat*, secured an area of the *firqat*'s choice. This would be a dominant area within its tribal region.
- Military engineers would then build a track providing vehicular access, followed by an airstrip if possible.
- A water drill was brought in, followed by a Civil Action Team with shop, school, clinic and mosque.
- SAF unit drew down leaving behind the *firqat* and the minimum strength needed to provide security.
- Water was pumped to the surface and into the distribution system prepared by military engineers to offer storage points for humans, and troughs for animals.
- Civilians came in from outlying areas and talk to *firqat*, SAF and Government representatives. They would be told that enemy activity in the area would result in the water supply being cut-off.

- Word would spread into the surrounding area that the insurgents and their supporters were no longer welcome, and the gradually the size of the 'oil spot' would increase.
- The insurgents, who depended on civilians for logistic and moral support, would lose their influence over them, and would typically re-locate elsewhere.
- Once the tribal area was secure, all SAF were withdrawn.

21. Brigadier John Akehurst, the last Commander of the Dhofar Brigade during the campaign, ascribed the reasons for success as follows:

**Insurgent mistakes:**

- Tried to replace deeply-rooted Islam with atheistic communism.
- Tried to break down tribalism before the people were ready.
- Cumbersome C2 structure.
- Reliance on a single line of communication.

**Friendly Force successes:**

- The development of Intelligence, and a deep understanding of the local Dhofari culture.
- Joint civil-military action, demonstrating that the indigenous civil power was in control.
- Undertaking measures that were designed specifically to win the support of the population away from the insurgent. This included control of the media, and the playing of a consistent strategic communication strategy that resonated with the locals.
- The use of airpower, particularly the novel use of aviation.
- The use of superior firepower in all set-piece engagements.
- Reforms resulting from well-targeted investment. These included wide ranging political reforms and investment in services which persuaded those dissidents who were motivated by conditions rather than cause.
- The successful separation of the insurgent from the population, followed by his piece-meal destruction.

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## CIVIL-MILITARY THEATRE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS – STUDY 3

### NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969 - 2007

22. Operation BANNER is the name given to the campaign that started in Northern Ireland in 1969, and subsequently ran for a total of almost 38 years. To date, it is the longest campaign ever fought by the British Army and its fellow Services; and is one of the very few ever brought to a successful conclusion by the armed forces of a developed nation against an irregular force. In this context, it provides a rich seam for analysis and lessons.

#### Outline of the Campaign

23. With the benefit of hindsight, the campaign can be described over 4 phases as follows:

- **Phase 1.** Phase 1 began in August 1969, and lasted until perhaps the summer of 1971. This period was largely characterized by widespread inter-communal violence and public disorder involving, marches, protests, rioting and looting. The local police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), was patently unprepared and incapable of dealing with the situation, and this triggered the initial involvement of British troops and the subsequent deployment of additional units<sup>7</sup>. The authorities lost confidence in the RUC, and they effectively ceased to act in a meaningful way until about 1976. In the interim, the Army took the lead.
- **Phase 2.** The next phase, from summer 1971 until the mid-1970s, is best described as a classic insurgency. Both the Official and Provisional wings of the IRA (OIRA and PIRA) fought the security forces in more-or-less formed bodies. Both had a recognisable structure of companies, battalions and brigades, supported by a logistics and headquarters staff. Protracted fire-fights were common. The Army responded with operations at up to brigade and even divisional level, the largest of these being Operation MOTORMAN. This was a large-scale, but time-limited, surge operation conducted over 4 months in late 1972. This successful operation marked the beginning of the end of the insurgency phase; OIRA declared a ceasefire, and PIRA began their process of transformation into a terrorist organisation based on a cell structure.

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<sup>7</sup> The initial task of the Army was to protect the Catholic areas from acts of violence and intimidation perpetrated by Protestants. However, by their apparent inability to prevent such attacks, the Army marginalised itself in the eyes of the Catholics, and the credibility of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) grew as they put themselves forward as the Catholic community's alternative 'protectors'.

- **Phase 3.** Phase 3 ran until November 1994 when PIRA announced the first of a number of its ceasefires. During this period, PIRA developed into one of the most effective terrorist organizations in history. Professional, dedicated, highly skilled and resilient, it conducted a sustained and lethal campaign in Northern Ireland, the UK mainland, and on the continent of Europe. From 1980 onwards, its political wing, Sinn Fein, involved itself in mainstream politics in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the UK.
- **Phase 4.** Except for a few relatively isolated breaches, the PIRA ceasefire declared in late 1994 held, and eventually led to the conditions that allowed the Good Friday Agreement to be signed in 1998. That was followed by a long process of political discussion, negotiation and the decommissioning of PIRA weapons. This final period can therefore be seen as the ‘long tail’ to Operation BANNER, and can be characterized by political efforts at conflict resolution. The operation was formally declared closed on 31 July 2007.

### **Civil-Military C2 Arrangements**

24. In August 1969, Headquarters Northern Ireland (HQ NI) consisted of a General Officer Commanding (GOC), (a 3\* officer), a Brigadier General Staff (BGS), two SO1s, four SO2s and three SO3s and little else. In response to events that summer, the HQ was rapidly expanded and existing roles and responsibilities were amended. The BGS became Chief of Staff (COS) at 2\* level and a Commander Land Forces (CLF), also a 2\* officer, was appointed effectively to become director of operations. This split of responsibilities allowed the GOC to manage the operational/strategic interface, and the CLF to manage the operational/tactical one. In addition, at that time there was one permanent brigade (39th Infantry Brigade) of just 3 battalions in the Province.

25. Initially, roulement units were used to reinforce these battalions, and they also comprised the headquarters of the deployable brigades based on the mainland. These ‘emergency tours’ were routinely of 4 months. Meanwhile, a second permanent brigade headquarters (HQ 8th Infantry Brigade) was established in Londonderry, followed by Headquarters 3rd Infantry Brigade in Portadown in February 1972. Whilst short tours by brigade headquarters had been a useful expedient initially, they did not provide the continuity required for a long counter-insurgency campaign. As the campaign progressed, the permanently established brigade headquarters provided the fixed infrastructure into which roulement units and reinforcement companies could fit with relative ease. In addition, fixed headquarters developed unmatched situational awareness and bespoke working practices specifically tailored to meet the demands of Northern Ireland’s unique operational environment.

26. From a military perspective, this command and control construct worked extremely well. However the weakness was initially at the political – military interface. The GOC reported to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), and day-to-day

oversight of operations and direction was conducted by a branch of the Ministry of Defence's (MOD) Directorate of Military Operations. In the early years however, the GOC had the delicate task of serving 3 different masters:

- Political direction came from Westminster and had to be, initially, enacted through Northern Ireland's own democratically elected Parliament at Stormont. However, due to its overtly pro-Protestant bias, the direction from Stormont tended to be badly flawed – and the introduction of Internment in the early 1970s was a classic example of this.
- Operational direction came from the MOD through MO4, and subsequently MO2.
- Finally, as the GOC was tasked with commanding the police, he was also initially responsible to the Home Secretary and the Home Office for police matters. This situation lasted until 1976, when police primacy of the RUC was once again re-established.

27. From a modern perspective, this construct appears to present some of the challenges of a rudimentary comprehensive approach. However, the GOC was given no real strategic direction within which to work. In 1969, given the Army's considerable and recent experience in dealing with 'internal security' situations up until that time, the general political consensus in Westminster was to adopt the line of least resistance by allowing the Army just to 'get on with it' and for them to 'sort it out'. Additionally, it did not help that the Minister of Defence, Denis Healey, and his counterpart in the Home Office, James Callaghan (a future Prime Minister), did not see eye-to-eye on the overall right approach to take. However, the Army was not used to operating in the UK without police support, and without any strategic plan established by the civil authorities. As a result, much of the activity of the Northern Ireland Joint Security Committee between 1969 and 1971 focussed on tactical issues, such as the control of marches or the removal of barricades, rather than on higher level, operational matters.

28. Initially, the formal relationship between the Army and the RUC was not well defined. Once 'police primacy' had been restored in 1976, the *'Way Ahead'* paper of the same year stated that the Army was to 'act in support of the RUC', but was no more explicit on the matter. In large areas of the Province, the RUC could operate freely, and so the question was largely academic. However, in the most difficult areas, such as West Belfast and South Armagh, the RUC could not operate without very considerable Army support. In practice, the Army led operations in those areas until the early 1990s, although the form of RUC support did evolve over the period.

29. At no stage in the campaign was there an explicit operational level plan as would be recognised today. This may appear surprising, but two major factors contributed to

this. The first is that campaign planning tools only appeared formally, in rudimentary form, in British Army doctrine in 1994, and thereafter in Joint doctrine. Up until then, it had been entirely normal to conduct campaigns, such as the Mau Mau in Kenya and the Malayan Emergency, by a series of ‘campaign directives’. The second factor was that no senior officer had the authority to write or impose a campaign plan across all the necessary lines of operation. In the absence of a single, authoritative, cross-government endorsed campaign plan, the net effect was:

- There was a lack of strategic vision, and no long-term plan (both in terms of process or product);
- There was no single authority in overall charge of the direction of the campaign, but rather a number of different agencies, often poorly coordinated;
- The little political control and direction that was available, tended to change each time there was a change of Government in Westminster – there were seven Prime Ministers during the course of the campaign, five within its first decade;
- The same phenomenon was apparent with changes in any of the senior military or police appointments, leading to a lack of a consistent approach;
- When the campaign evolved from an insurgency to a terrorist campaign, the response - Internment - was ill conceived and inappropriate;
- Effective engagement by other Government Departments was inconsistent and of variable quality;
- The gearing of tactical activities to strategic or operational purpose was generally not particularly close;
- Although regularly and successfully engaged at the tactical level, PIRA was almost never engaged at the operational or strategic levels;
- Action against terrorists was not linked closely to addressing the causes of the problem;
- The ‘wheel was often re-invented’, and progress was unnecessarily slow resulting in significant political, economic and human cost.

30. In practice, much depended on individuals, their personalities, and how they got on. Overall, the picture is of generally able and well intentioned men doing what they believed best with generally a similar sense of purpose.

31. In common with other campaigns, the committee structure was a critical aspect of the exercise of command in Northern Ireland. Operational and intelligence committees were established right at the beginning of the campaign, and persisted throughout. At higher levels, there were the Security Policy Meetings at GOC-level and Security Coordination Meetings at CLF-level. Traditional terminology such as ‘District (or ‘Divisional’) Action Committees’ (DAC) and ‘Sub-DACs’ also persisted. This joint system was the everyday mechanics of coordination, principally between the uniformed Army and the RUC. At higher levels, it included RUC Special Branch and other intelligence collection agencies. This system went some way to mitigate the

effect of having no single authority for the campaign as a whole. Another facet was the broad range of professional working committees at HQ NI and brigade level which considered everything from land use through electromagnetic spectrum management to flight safety for civilian and military users.

32. Over time, C2 structures matured and evolved in tune with the ebb and flow of the campaign. Among other achievements noted was:

- The importance of developing first rate intelligence structures, processes and capabilities, so that military operations could be intelligence-led, and non-military initiatives could be properly planned and directed.
- The effectiveness of HQ NI as a theatre HQ, and its ability to offer long-term continuity during a campaign with no set or obvious timescale was a major success. The HQ established and maintained (under its command and its budget) the closely linked loop encompassing intelligence, specialist civilian advisors, tactical planners and training staffs who could react quickly to events as they occurred and adapt their responses to them as they evolved.

### **Enabling Host Nation Government**

33. In the early days, political oversight of operations in Northern Ireland came from London, but had to be passed through ministers in the Government of Northern Ireland at Stormont. This chain had to be respected as London could not ignore what was, after all, a democratically elected government, and one loyal to the Crown. However, to Catholic eyes, with its overly pro-Protestant bias, Stormont was a totally discredited organisation. This tainted the perceptions of the Catholic community, hardened prejudices amongst them and drove the majority into the ranks of Republicanism.

34. In the wake of Bloody Sunday, and faced with a bleakly deteriorating security situation, Stormont was dissolved and, on 24 March 1972, direct rule from Westminster was imposed. In its place, the Northern Ireland Office<sup>8</sup> (NIO) was created. The imposition of direct rule saw the appointment of the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (SSNI) and to date, 16 MPs have served in this post. One of the effects of direct rule was the SSNI remained at the heart of national government in London, yet he could find himself divorced from actual events on the ground. Nevertheless, it was a first, albeit tentative, step in the right direction. For example, during Internment, successive SSNIs were ordering the release of detainees whilst the security forces were rounding them up. The GOC and the Chief Constable both requested that releases be linked to some behavioural advantage. For example, there

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<sup>8</sup> The role of the Northern Ireland Office has evolved and is currently '*...to support the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in securing a lasting peace, based on the [Good Friday] Agreement in which the rights and identities of all traditions are fully respected and safeguarded and in which a safe, stable, just, open and tolerant society can thrive and prosper.*'

might be no further releases until a ceasefire be put in place. However, that advice was not taken, and terrorists took advantage of this confusion, viewing it as a sign of weakness that could be exploited.

35. Recognising the fracture between the political and military interfaces, successive GOCs had called for the appointment of some form of civilian ‘supremo’. His appointment would have bridged the evident gap that existed, and would have helped to create a single campaign authority, providing it with coherence. They argued that such a person need not be military, and his task would be to coordinate the full range of political, economic, social, legal, cultural, informational and security measures that needed to be implemented under a comprehensive approach. This advice was never taken.

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## **CIVIL-MILITARY THEATRE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS – STUDY 4**

### **IRAQ >2003**

*“You cannot be deployed in an environment, without being properly involved; otherwise you become a victim of events, rather than being able to shape them.”*

COS, MND(SW), Iraq

### **Outline of the Campaign**

36. The United Kingdom has carried out military operations in Iraq since 2003 under the codename 'Operation TELIC' and as part of a wider coalition that formed 'Multi-National Force - Iraq' (MNF-I). The deployment was the UK’s largest military operation since Operation GRANBY<sup>9</sup> and at its inception witnessed the deployment of 46,000 personnel from all 3 armed Services, including some 19 warships, 14 Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, 15,000 vehicles, 115 fixed-wing aircraft and nearly 100 helicopters. In addition it was supported, in the UK and elsewhere, by large numbers

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<sup>9</sup> Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Operation GRANBY saw the deployment of 53,462 UK personnel to Saudi Arabia as part of a coalition of nations. The aim was to prevent further Iraqi aggression and liberate Kuwait.

from the Services, civilians and contractors. This Operation was considerably larger than the 1982 Operation CORPORATE in the Falklands, which saw 30,000 personnel deployed, and the Korean War, which saw less than 20,000 personnel deployed.

37. As part of the initial US-led Coalition intervention, Operation TELIC sought to create the conditions in which Iraq would disarm in accordance with its obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Within this overall objective, 2 key tenets were to remove Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime and, based on the evidence available at the time, disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction together with their associated programmes and means of delivery. The mission of MNF-I continued to work in partnership with the Government of Iraq (GOI) to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, through the direct provision of security and most importantly training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) so that the Iraqi authorities take responsibility for providing security themselves.

38. Operation TELIC took place against a backdrop of concurrent operations and commitments, such as the continuing obligations in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Northern Ireland and the fire-fighters' strike. The Royal Air Force was also already over-flying northern and southern Iraq as part of the effort to enforce no-fly zones. In addition, the Royal Navy had maintained a continuous presence in the Gulf region enforcing United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iraq since 1991.

39. The Iraq campaign can be characterised as falling into 2 distinct periods: the conflict period (which included: Phase I – Preparation, Phase II – Deployment, Phase III – Combat and Phase IV – Recover), and the post-conflict period (which became known as post-Phase IV). During the short conflict phase, UK and Coalition forces had achieved nearly all their military objectives including the removal of Saddam's Ba'athist regime and the securing of key infrastructure within 4 weeks of crossing the border from Kuwait into Iraq. The major exception was that no weapons of mass destruction were found. Success was achieved with few United Kingdom combat or Iraqi civilian casualties, due in part to stringent targeting criteria and the use of precision weapons. The coordinated focus of Coalition combat power led to the regular Iraqi forces having, in the main, little will to fight in a concerted fashion.

40. The post-conflict period unexpectedly developed into a nation-building endeavour undertaken by the Coalition and its Iraqi partners. This was set against the backdrop of a vicious, escalating insurgency which occasionally bordered on civil war. The escalation of violence took place very rapidly, and initially took the Coalition by surprise. In addition, the scale of the nation-building task had initially been underestimated with little prior preparation and planning in place to support it.

## Civil-Military Command and Control Arrangements

41. Shortly after the 2003 invasion, and following the dismantling of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, the Coalition created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on 21 April 2003, based in the Green Zone, Baghdad. Citing UNSCR 1483 (22 May 2003) and the laws of war, the CPA vested itself with executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government, acting as the transitional government of Iraq. Although, originally headed by Jay Garner, a former US military officer, President Bush appointed Paul Bremer as the CPA head from 11 May 2003 until its dissolution, following the transition of sovereignty on 28 June 2004. Post Phase IV planning had underestimated the degree of coalition involvement in post-conflict security and stabilization operations, and therefore the immediate task for the CPA was to deal with a deteriorating security situation in the summer of 2003. This required the establishment of a number of Iraqi security organizations<sup>10</sup> in an attempt to use Iraqi manpower and expertise to address the problems. In some cases Iraqi institutions that had previously existed under the Saddam regime were re-established with a new mandate and new leadership. In other cases, new organizations were stood up to address perceived needs.

42. The Iraqi Transitional Government, elected by the Iraqi people on 31 January 2005, formed with the purpose of drafting a permanent constitution. A referendum held on 15 October 2005 ratified the new Iraqi Constitution, followed by a general election in December 2005 to elect an Iraqi National Assembly with participation from Sunnis as well as the Kurds and Shias. Following approval by the members of the Iraqi National Assembly, the current GOI subsequently took office on 20 May 2006, succeeding the Iraqi Transitional Government which had continued in office in a caretaker capacity until the formation of this permanent government.

43. A recent operational analysis study by US JFCOM suggests that coalition operations should ideally have a single civil-military lead that enacts a coalition comprehensive approach in theatre. This construct highlights the conflict of interest in establishing national chains of command and suggests a requirement for PJHQ to relinquish operational command of UK forces deployed on such operations, opting to embed its staff within the coalition levels of command, both civil and military, to influence the conduct of operations; as opposed to executing both operational and tactical levels of command remotely from Northwood. The conduct of operations within national area of responsibilities' must be directed through the coalition command structures if unity of effort and purpose is to be achieved. Such a construct demands contributing nations to subordinate national priorities and resources to a unified leadership, who allocate missions and task to the coalition, guided by clear

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<sup>10</sup> These institutions included: Iraqi Police, Iraqi Facilities Protective Service, Iraqi Border Guards, Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, New Iraqi Army – Conflict Studies Research Centre Iraqi Civil Military Relations Dr G Herd and Colonel Howcroft August 2005.

national policy on the employment of its resources. Only then will the conditions exist that afford civil-military lead and a single focus for interaction with interested agencies, organisations and the host nation. Any other model is fraught with national tensions and fault lines which present opportunity to irregular activists, so undermining civil-military efforts to secure and stabilise the environment, the precondition for political, economic and social progress.

44. Our national experience within Iraq underlines the importance of ensuring that national priorities are finessed at the political-strategic level, allowing operational and tactical commanders political space to operate within a coalition chain of command and act upon those priorities articulated. This requires subordinate partners within a coalition to support the coalition's comprehensive approach under a central but unified civil-military leadership. This relationship is pivotal and shapes the attitude, relationship and design of an integrated headquarters, which must engage in joint and interagency planning. The Iraq campaign is a classical example that demonstrates how national chains of command potentially undermine such a comprehensive approach and latterly gives a clear indication of how senior coalition leadership can unite ad-hoc coalitions

### **Extending Host Nation Government Influence**

45. In April 2008, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, informed the US administration that Iraqi security forces were capable of assuming their duties and that coalition troops should be pulled out as the situation allowed. On 13 June 2008, Nuri al-Maliki said that negotiations on a long-term security pact were deadlocked, reaching an impasse over Iraqi sovereignty, principally on the right of "US forces to... jail Iraqis or assume, alone, the responsibility of fighting against terrorism."<sup>11</sup> In January 2009, the control of the Green Zone and Saddam Hussein's presidential palace were handed over to the GOI in a ceremonial move described by the country's prime minister as a 'restoration of Iraq's sovereignty'.

46. Under the operational command of Commander Joint Operations (CJO), UK's senior military command structure for forces deployed throughout the joint operational area (JOA) included a 3-star Senior British Military Representative – Iraq (SBMR-I) embedded within MNF-I, a 2-star Senior British Military Advisor (SBMA) embedded in US Central Command (Tampa/Qatar), a UK 2-star Deputy Commanding General (DCG) within MNC-I, 1-star Air (UK ACC in Qatar) and Maritime (UK MCC in Bahrain) component commanders and GOC MND (SE), who doubled as COMBRITFOR. Outside of the MNF-I chain of command and within the JOA, COMBRITFOR has routinely been authorised to conduct liaison with the GOI, Iraqi provincial authorities, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), UK diplomatic and OGD representatives, and representatives of the UN, World Bank and aid agencies.

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<sup>11</sup> Agence France-Presse article dated 13 June 2008.

47. The mission of the MNF-I, in partnership with the GOI, has been to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. From a military perspective this has involved the direct provision of security by MNF-I, together with the provision of training and equipping the ISF so that the Iraqi authorities are, increasingly, able to take responsibility for providing security themselves, upholding the rule of law and guaranteeing the stability necessary for sustainable democracy and economic development in Iraq. As outlined during his speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Gordon Brown reaffirmed the UK mission; to seek: <sup>12</sup> ‘the creation of an independent, prosperous, democratic Iraq that is free of terrorist violence, secure within its borders and a stable presence in the region.’ The current UK mission, therefore, focuses on monitoring<sup>13</sup>, mentoring and training the ISF<sup>14</sup>.

## **CIVIL-MILITARY THEATRE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS – STUDY 5**

### **AFGHANISTAN >2001**

*‘The International Community’s lukewarm commitment to Afghanistan after 9/11 has been matched only by its incompetence, incoherence and conflicting strategies – all led by the United States.’<sup>15</sup>*

#### **Outline of the Campaign**

48. The US-led coalition’s military intervention into Afghanistan was in direct response to the attacks on the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. The intervention was authorised under UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). In October 2001, a small US and British force, assisted by anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance, succeeded in ousting the Taliban regime from Kabul. Immediately thereafter, a larger scale, NATO intervention force was sent in to secure the capital, and begin the pacification and rebuilding of the country as a whole. This immediately gave rise to the concurrent campaigns of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), led by Coalition Forces Command – Afghanistan, and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). OEF’s mission is focussed on the destruction of al-Qaeda and its support network; whilst ISAF’s mission is more focussed on supporting the host nation government and assisting with reconstruction and development. This duality adds a layer of complexity to an already complex operating environment. To date, these parallel campaigns continue with their respective, but separate, strategic objectives. Alongside these military campaigns lie

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<sup>12</sup> Prime Minister Gordon Brown speech to Parliament on 22 July 2008.

<sup>13</sup> Referred to as an 'overwatch' role.

<sup>14</sup> UK retains responsibility for training and mentoring the Iraqi Police, Navy, Air Force, and Department of Border Enforcement. UK Armed forces specifically have responsibility for assisting the 14th Division of the Iraqi Army.

<sup>15</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism Is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia*. Penguin Group, 2008.

numerous civilian development programmes initiated by members of the International Community and comprise both International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO).

49. Apart from this recent activity, Afghanistan has a long history of inter-tribal fighting and foreign military intervention. Arguably, few of these interventions have attained the objectives that were originally sought, and power remained vested in groups and individuals that were not necessarily aligned to the central government in Kabul. Recognising the historical factors that have shaped the population and their psyche is, in many ways, the key to understanding the interactions of the various groups. Developing an appropriate campaign plan, led by the Afghan government and with the full multiplicity of actors involved, will enable the indigenous population to achieve a lasting peace. The myriad objectives by all the groups active in the country make any kind of unity of effort largely impractical, but strong leadership and a recognised plan should provide the framework within which unity of purpose should be possible.

### **Civil-Military Command and Control Arrangements**

50. In order to assess the C2 aspects of the post-2001 military campaign within a civil-military context, this piece will concentrate in large part on the role of ISAF Headquarters and that of Task Force Helmand (with effect from 2006, the UK's primary national focus in the international intervention in Afghanistan). There will be aspects of other activities across the country which have a bearing on these two military elements, and these specific areas will be addressed; otherwise, the wider national situation will not be discussed.

51. In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), the UN has appointed the head of UNAMA (the Special Representative of the Secretary General) as the coordinator of the international development effort, and ISAF is authorised to provide the necessary security framework within which development efforts can take root. As ISAF has expanded from Kabul, so responsibility for security provision has been transferred to NATO. In simple terms, that leaves UNAMA, under the direction of the SRSG, to coordinate the international civilian response to the crisis; and ISAF, under the command of the NATO 4\* general, to provide security and to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); all, in support of the growing capacity of the GIROA. However, this fails to reflect the complexity of the situation, and key (but by no means, all) stakeholders at each level are:

	<b>National</b>	<b>Regional</b>	<b>Provincial</b>
<b>Civil</b>	UNAMA, UNDP, WB, WFP, ICRC, International Donors, EUPOL	UNDP, Donors	UNDP, Donors
<b>Military</b>	ISAF, OEF,	ISAF RCs, PRTs	PRTs, ISAF TFs
<b>Political</b>	GIRoA, ANSF, ANDS; Pakistan		Provincial Governors, Shuras, local governance arrangements, ANSF, PDPs

52. Chains of command are equally complicated, with UNAMA, UNDP and other UN organisations working to UNSC directives, OEF working directly for US CENTCOM, World Bank operating independently, donors all working to their own national agendas, ISAF Headquarters operating via the NATO chain of command to the NAC, whilst RCs are primarily answerable to their national capitals, within the general command intent from ISAF Headquarters. Similarly, ISAF task forces are answerable to their national military headquarters and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) delivering programmes set by their sponsor governments. It is therefore not surprising that ISAF Headquarters has little traction with military command and control, let alone delivering within a coordinated civil-military arrangement.

53. At the national level, civil-military cooperation has been undergoing a significant overhaul since late 2007. A combined UNAMA/ISAF initiative attempted to deliver a comprehensive approach across all actors involved in the reconstruction and development of the country. This was ‘Afghanised’ as an Integrated Approach which aimed to go some way in strengthening cooperation between partners. Although there has been an improvement at the working level between GIRoA, UNAMA, ISAF and with many of the International Organisations and NGOs engaging up to a point, the absence of a single ‘supremo’ who draws all the strings together and combines both responsibility and authority, has been missing.

54. At the provincial level, specifically in the case of Helmand, the formalisation of a Civil-Military Mission with a civilian lead (2\* civil servant) has helped make significant improvements to the coherency of activity. The considerable friction that had previously occurred between the two separate entities (Task Force Helmand and the, largely independent, Helmand PRT) has now been overcome. In addition, the Helmand Road Map, has ensured a common trajectory. Despite these improvements, there remains a level of complication with linking in with the Afghan leadership and the Provincial development programme, and some questions remain over the future of the military mission.

**Summaries:**

## 55. Civil- Military C2 - What hasn't worked (so far):

- Coherence in NATO/UN leadership of a single campaign has not been satisfactorily achieved.
- An absence of NATO unified command across the CJOA results in limited control from HQ ISAF.
- The conduct of three concurrent, yet incoherent, campaigns (Counter Terrorism, COIN and Counter Narcotics) all within the context of stabilisation and poverty relief risks sending mixed messages to civilians.
- PRTs delivering largely their own solutions, reporting back to their own national agendas.
- The military relationship with NGOs has not been good, resulting in a degree of civ-mil distrust.

## 56. Civil- Military C2 - What is working:

- UNAMA, ISAF Headquarters, GIRoA cooperation is continually improving.
- The Civil-Military Mission, Helmand (CMMH) is beginning to deliver coherent civil-military solutions in Helmand Province.

**Enabling Host Nation Government****Recognised Shortcomings:**

- The parallel structures of GIRoA, PRTs, UN organisations and NGOs all attempting to utilise the limited pool of indigenous expertise restricts capacity growth of GIRoA;
- The inappropriate application of a western democratic model constrains the development of locally owned solutions;
- The International Community (IC) is focused on delivering a largely industrial, urban solution for an agrarian, rural nation adding to the size of the problem to be addressed;
- The IC is impatient for rapid results, putting unnecessary pressure on the nascent host nation government;
- Development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has been very slow to get started, and continues to struggle to deliver a legitimate civil police force. This fundamentally undermines the rule of law;
- The production of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) has been hindered by IC interference and separate agendas, and has absorbed a large amount of very limited national resources;

- The IC's use of the Afghan diaspora for providing their analysis can result in skewed understanding of situations, although this does avoid further pressure on indigenous subject matter experts.

### **Recognised Successes:**

- The link between ANDS and the Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) is a tangible example of central government and provincial coherency;
- The ability of the GIRoA to express anger with the particular instances of IC interference is indicative of a fledgling government gaining strength;
- The growth of the Afghan National Army in size and capability has been very significant, though not without its problems;
- The implementation, albeit ponderous and painful, of parallel development and capacity building programmes.
- The strength of the Ministry of Mines is largely a result of significant guidance, mentoring and support of IC subject matter experts. This has the potential to manage the country's natural resources, generating large sums of money that will underpin future development;

### **Wider C2 Issues**

#### **Problems:**

- The equal status of Commander ISAF and the Special Representative of the Secretary General, in an attempt to mirror the civil-military arrangements in SHAPE, is impractical and unhelpful as neither share the same mandate.
- At best, ISAF/ANSF/Pakistan Military cooperation is tolerated by each of the players, but lacks any real cooperation.
- A lack of a coherent campaign plan, supported by a unified force, is increasing the impact of specialist stovepipes and reducing the chances of success at national level.
- A lack of trust between national providers of J2 input is leading to poor J2 product.

#### **Successes:**

- Use of 'Commander's Intent' from the Headquarters enables the Regional Commands to operate within the constraints of their national restrictions.
- The personal drive of some commanders is overcoming systemic inertia and delivering some coordinated results.

## OBSERVATIONS FROM THE COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THEATRE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

<p><u>Key:</u></p> <p>✓ - Attribute met in most aspects.</p> <p>✗ - Attribute not met in most aspects.</p> <p>- - Unable to define whether the attribute was convincingly met or not.</p>	<p>The C2 Attributes identified relate to generic Functional Attributes that are considered essential in the implementation of any C2 architecture that attempts to operationalise the cross-government, inter-agency, comprehensive approach. The table is not exhaustive, there may be other Attributes recently identified that did not apply to any of the campaigns studied. The Attributes used in this table have been identified as common C2 characteristics in two or more of the campaigns studied, and are broadly consistent with JDN 4/05, <i>The Comprehensive Approach</i>, paras. 113 – 127.</p>
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		C2 Attribute	Malaya	Oman	Northern Ireland	Iraq	Afghanistan
<b>Civil-Military C2 Arrangements</b>	Appointment of single authority at strategic level.	✓(1)	✓	✗	✓(1)	✗(1)	
	Shared political-military vision of the end-state.	✓	✓	-(1)	✓	✓(2)	
	Cooperative planning generating a single campaign plan.	✓	✓	-	-(2)	✗	
	Coherent coordination arrangements that flow from the strategic to the tactical levels.	✓	✓	✓	-(3)	-(3)	
	Shared intelligence and information management.	✓	✓	✓	✗(4)	✗(4)	
	Pol-mil chains of command organised to deliver unity of effect (shared outcomes).	✓	✓	✗(2)	✓	✗	

	<b>C2 Attribute</b>	<b>Malaya</b>	<b>Oman</b>	<b>Northern Ireland</b>	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>
<b>Extending Host Nation Government Influence</b>	Indigenous involvement in planning and execution.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Coherent strategic messaging and information strategy.	✓	✓	-	-	-
	Inter-agency investment in capacity building.	✓(2)	✓(1)	-(3)	✓(5)	✓(5)
	<b>C2 Attribute</b>	<b>Malaya</b>	<b>Oman</b>	<b>Northern Ireland</b>	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>
<b>Notes:</b>		(1) Lt Gen Templar was appointed High Commissioner, and on the retirement of the Director of military Operations, assumed that role too. (2) Focussed initially on building a strong police Special Branch to handle the intelligence, then switched to recruiting and training Home Guard units.	(1) SAS-led activity on the raising and training of indigenous force units ( <i>firqats</i> ).	(1) Consensus eventually arrived at through exhaustive political discourse. (2) The military, police and civil HQs were all dislocated. (3) Not applicable in the same sense.	(1) Exemplified by the Crocker/Petreus relationship. (2) Only developed latterly. (3) PRTs are under national command. (4) Very limited intelligence sharing between coalition partners, and insufficient use being made of indigenous intelligence collection potential. (5) Comprehensive SSR package largely under US lead.	(1) The appointment of Lord Ashdown in this role was rejected. (2) Concurrent campaigns results in multiple end states (3) PRTs are under national command, and do not have to conform to the ANDS. (4) Very limited intelligence sharing between coalition partners, and insufficient use being made of indigenous intelligence collection potential. (5) Comprehensive SSR package, initially very stove-piped, now brought increasingly under US lead.