



## **Operation CORPORATE 1982**

**Key documents concerning the sinking of the BELGRANO**  
**Released in support of the *Official History of the Falklands Campaign***

Produced by  
CinC Fleet  
Ministry of Defence

REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS VOLUME 60GTHE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 1982OPERATION CORPORATE

Contents	1
Cross References	3
HMS CC INQUEROR's report (D/NHE/MEM/2502/16/2)	10
Annex A: Event Report 01	25
Event Report 02	29
Annex C: Command and Control	33
Annex D: Navigation	34
Annex E: Weather, Oceanography and Sonar	37
Annex F: Communications	39
Annex G: Marine Engineering	47
Annex H: Weapons Engineering	51
Annex I: Ship's Divers	63
Annex J: Training	64
Annex K: Supply	65
Annex L: Medical	68
Annex M: Environmental Control	70
Annex N:	73
Annex O: Administration and Personnel	74
Annex to HMS CONQUEROR's report: Narrative	76
April	78
May	133
Attack on GENERAL BELGRANO	146
15 May	196
23 May - Diver in Water	226
June	251

## SECTION 1

### OPERATIONS IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE

1. The Total Exclusion Zone, of 200 nautical miles radius around the Falkland Islands, was established at 1100Z on 30 April. The main body of the Task Force entered the TEZ that day and commenced operations to establish air and sea superiority in the area.

#### PORT STANLEY AIRPORT

2. One of the first priorities was to deny the enemy free use of Port Stanley airfield. On the morning of 1 May Vulcan aircraft, operating with tanker support from Ascension Island, conducted a bombing raid on Port Stanley airfield. Twenty one 1,000 lb bombs were dropped on the airfield, and subsequent photographic reconnaissance showed that limited damage had been achieved to the runway. Shortly after the Vulcan raid Sea Harriers from the Task Force followed up with bombing and photographic reconnaissance runs. During the night ships of the Task Force conducted Naval Gun Fire Support (NGS) on Stanley airfield.

3. There were three further Vulcan raids on Port Stanley Airfield in May and Sea Harriers attacked on numerous occasions. However, the airfield was not completely closed, thus confirming the difficulty of airfield denial operations using old, conventional metal bombs. The raids did, however, succeed in disrupting Argentinian resupply, destroyed a number of aircraft on the ground, as well as equipment and supplies.

#### SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

4. On 2 May the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for SSNs were revised to allow attacks on any Argentinian warships outside the TEZ and at 1856Z that day, HMS CONQUEROR fired a salvo of 3 torpedoes at the cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO. Two struck and the BELGRANO sank with the loss of some 400 lives. This successful attack was to have a profound effect on future maritime operations, as after picking up survivors from the BELGRANO, the Argentinian Navy retired to within the 12 mile limit of territorial waters and did not dare to show themselves again throughout the Falkland Islands campaign. Our submarines were instructed not to interfere with rescue operations after this sinking. A fuller description of Submarine Operations is given in Section 5.

#### ASSESSMENT OF THREAT

5. From the beginning of the month there were indications that the Argentines intended to launch major air attacks against the Task Group, certainly from the mainland and possibly also from the CVA, 25 DE MAYO. In the event all air attacks against the Task Group were launched from mainland airfields, although aircraft taken from 25 DE MAYO were involved. In anticipation of attacks

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
42	2 May	[12.07Z]	MOD signals CTF 317 authorising extension of ROEs to permit attack on all Argentine vessels outside TEZ, [except for 12 mile coastal strip]	MOD 02[207Z]		055	
43	2 May	[12.38Z]	CTG 324.3 relays change in ROEs	CTG 324.3		055	

of explosives has created many a good tale for the future. However, the removal of the 18500 lbs of equipment considerably improved stowage problems in the fore-ends.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

18. Problems associated with communications (Annex F) started with the damage to the wireless mast and became steadily worse by the 27th.

the Command believed that with no HF and unreliable SSIIXS reception, the submarine would be forced to withdraw from the Operation for a wireless mast change. Overnight 27/28th the submarine remained within UHF range of TG 317.9, awaiting instructions and in a thoroughly depressed frame of mind. However, after an exchange of signals, COR 135 was received at 280330 from CTG, allocating areas in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands. By conference, this showed the Command that despite the communications problems, Operation CORPORATE was still on for CONQUEROR. Much heartened, the submarine dived at 0650 and started the transit to the West. Operation PARAQUET complete and re-joining Operation CORPORATE.

#### ANTI-SHIPPING PATROL TO SOUTH AND SOUTH WEST OF FALKLAND ISLANDS 28 APRIL TO 6 MAY

19. The first week after re-joining Operation CORPORATE was spent on an ASV patrol to the South and South West of the Falkland Islands, operating inside and outside the 200 mile Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). Although not formally assigned as such, the submarine was operating on associated support to TG 317.8. Initial instructions were to locate and remain with the Argentinian Task Group TG 79.3. This was thought to consist of the Cruiser BELGRANO, the destroyers SOUCHARD and BUENO in company with the oiler PUERTO ROSALES and perhaps the tug GURRUCHAGA. The force was assessed to be conducting operations in shallow water some forty miles to the North of ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS. In addition, the submarine was ordered to report early any indication that the group was heading towards South Georgia.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

20. The submarine surfaced at 301125 to stream the ANG wire with its HF tail in order to improve HF broadcast reception. The Command was concerned that the streamed wire might lead to counter-detection by close ASW units but responded to the advice of CTG. In retrospect, this proved to be an excellent decision. The combination of improving HF reception as the submarine moved West, together with BILATERAL SSIIXS reception, meant that although communications reception remained a problem, it was now containable.

#### DETECTION OF TG 79.3

21. The detection and subsequent trail of TG 79.3 is discussed fully in Event Report 01. Initial detection was made on the oiler PUERTO ROSALES' Diesel signature at 301645 on the towed array at a reconstructed range in excess of fifty miles. After closing the bearing overnight, the group was

detected on broadband sonar at 010620 May and sighted visually at 1254. CONQUEROR manoeuvred into a trailing position on the port quarter of the group, reported contact and proceeded to trail the ships East at twelve knots, skirting the TEZ by twenty miles.

#### ATTACK ON TG 79.3

22. At 020805, the force reversed course and increased speed slightly and appeared to be heading back towards ARGENTINA. By 1625, CONQUEROR had received new ROE that allowed attack on Argentinian warships outside the TEZ. The submarine went deep to close the group and subsequently carried out a successful Mark 8 torpedo attack on the Cruiser BELGRANO. This resulted in two hits that sank her about one hour later. Intelligence intercept later reported the destroyer BOUCHARD had claimed to have been hit by a torpedo that failed to detonate. If true, this could have accounted for the third torpedo and would correlate with sonar recordings of a third hit. This was undoubtedly the highlight of the patrol and is claimed as the most Southerly engagement in the South Atlantic to date by a Royal Naval warship. It is covered fully in Event Report 02. Random depth charging by the two destroyers caused CONQUEROR to withdraw at speed to the South before circling slowly to the BURDWOOD BANK/ ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS Gap to hopefully re-attack the returning destroyers.

#### INVESTIGATION OF SAR DATUM

23. On 4th, while patrolling towards the BELGRANO Datum, a merchant ship, later identified as probably the converted hospital ship MV BAHIA PARAISO, was detected and subsequently trailed to the Argentinian SAR Datum. Other units visually sighted on the search were the tug CURRUCHAGA, the two SUMNER Class destroyers and a 707 aircraft and a small helicopter. Since now ROE denied attack on warships engaged in SAR activity, the submarine withdrew to the North, leaving the destroyers unmolested.

#### PROTECTION OF HMS SHEFFIELD

24. At 041945, COR 199 was received, ordering CONQUEROR to protect the damaged SHEFFIELD from possible EXOCET attack by the destroyers BOUCHARD and BUENO. The submarine moved East in response and spent twelve hours on patrol in the North East corner of her area. After receipt of further signals that sadly suggested SHEFFIELD was not worth protecting and that changed the ROE to allow attacks on the SUMNER Class destroyers, CONQUEROR moved South West to close several contacts in the vicinity of the SAR Datum.

#### CHASE OF SUPERTANKER

25. There followed a confusing seven hour period when the submarine made contact deep in poor visibility with at least three ships and then trailed deep and fast what was thought to be two of them - a merchant vessel and possibly a warship. Returning to periscope depth after a prolonged stern chase, the contacts were sighted as one heavily laden supertanker on transit West. The two destroyers had escaped detection. The following morning, COR 205 was received reporting that the two DLGs were en route to USHVAIA for repairs that included unexploded torpedo damage to the BOUCHARD.

- c. On receipt of the appropriate ROE, CONQUEROR conducted a mark 8 torpedo attack on the Cruiser BELGRANO resulting in two hits. The ship subsequently sunk indicating that there is still a role for the Mark 8 torpedo attack against a suitable target. This is claimed as the most southerly Royal Naval engagement in the ATLANTIC to date.
- d. After the destruction of the BELGRANO, Argentinian Naval Units ceased to operate outside territorial waters with the exception of the shallow water of 'El RINCON' off Pta BELGRANO. This reduced the threat to the Task Group.
- e. Damage to the wireless mast on the 20th April severely degraded CONQUEROR's operational ability necessitating long hours at periscope depth attempting to receive traffic.

RECOMMENDATIONS

61. a. The members of the Ship's Company named in CONQUEROR's AJA/19F/WAK 192001Z Jun are recommended for immediate awards in recognition of their bravery or meritorious service.
- b. Ship and UKSUBCAMS Staff should meet to discuss fully the Communications difficulties experienced with a view to eliminating them before the next patrol.
- c. The recommendations in Annex F concerning Communications should be studied with a view to improving Communications Control.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant

*Charles Brown*

C L WREFOED-BROWN  
Commander, Royal Navy  
Commanding Officer

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SSNs AT 30 APRIL

BACKGROUND

Because the MOD considered that the rules in FOT1 0204 were insufficiently explicit to be used for OPERATION CORPORATE, 14 special rules for SSNs were drawn up (Annex A) and issued to MODUKNAVY's 071045Z APR. Subsequently ROE 5 was amended twice, (MODUK's 101448Z and 160849Z), firstly to read; ".....may be presumed to be Arg and may be attacked" and finally to read, "Any Submarine detected not classified nuclear may be presumed to be Arg and may be attacked".

CURRENT RULES

2. The following rules were extant at the end of April:-

CORPORATE

i. INSIDE MEZ

- 4 (Warships and Auxiliaries may be attacked)
- 5. (Submarines may be attacked)
- 12. (Continue Patrol after first successful attack)
- 13. (SITREPS required on Arg Forces).

ii. OUTSIDE MEZ

- 1. (Carry out surveillance MT 25 MAY)
- 3. (25 MAY only may be attacked)
- 5. (Submarines may be attacked)
- 10. (Report after first successful attack)
- 13. (SITREPS required on Arg Forces).

3. The following rules were in force for OPERATION PARAQUET but are now in abeyance.

i. INSIDE 200NM OF SOUTH GEORGIA

- 4. (Warships and Auxiliaries may be attacked)
- 5. (Submarines may be attacked)
- 13. (SITREPS required on Arg Forces)

ii. OUTSIDE 200NM OF SOUTH GEORGIA

- 1. (Carry out surveillance)
- 5. (Submarines may be attacked)
- 13. (SITREPS required on Arg Forces).

135 Received COR 153, 155, 156. Reasonable reception on the wire.  
B - 268/092 T - 05 Very similar to T - 04

200 Position 54 29S 62 23W  
Weather Wind 10 knots from 270 Vis 6 NM  
Seastate 2 from 270 SSS 2  
Cloud 40% SVI not taken

05 CO COMMENT

COR 153 states BELGRANO Group (79.3) was thought to be in Area MIGUEL (5410S, 64 40W) at 301400Z. Area MIGUEL is some 75 NM from me to the WNW. T - 05's filtered bearings (diesel signature) fall across this Area. It is a good point in which to operate because:-

- a. Average depth of water is about 65M
- b. It sits behind a 29M shallow patch
- c. It is under ARG Air Cover
- d. It is only 35 NM from the TEZ.

I am now between MIGUEL and the route to S.GEORGIA. Intention is to close the shallow water overnight and investigate the Area tomorrow morning. If they are there, one can only say our intelligence support is EXCELLENT.

2046 Sunset

2059 CO DAILY SUMMARY

Surfaced this morning to stream my wire and HF tail and to test UHF emergency aerial. The latter proved that my problems are in my aerials as SSIXS worked perfectly on it. Have been heading toward the Area MIGUEL all day as intelligence suggests this is where TG 79.3 will be. Hopefully my diesel Tonal is the first contact that will lead me to them.


2063 TURDAY 1 MAY 1982

206 CO COMMENT

Received COR 159 - New Area Allocation. Areas allocated leave out two blocks - Dog Two Xray and Yankee, 60 by 70 NM to West of LOS ESTAD OS. This does not make sense. Sent Sitrep 21/82 asking for the reason.

2000 B - 297/153 T - 06. Group of unstable lines.

2020 C/C 150 to resolve ambiguity of T - 06  
B - 280 T - 06 possibly bearing whine (from TG 79.3?)



ISLA DE LOS ESTANOS.

P-56

67 4

0745

CO COMMENT

COR 160 (partially decrypted) suggests 79.3 will leave Area MIGUEL at 1600 to head East, possibly into TeZ. I will go and have a look now and then fall back to deep water.

0750

B - 246. S 42 Faint aural contact 1 X 4 126 revs - possibly MV.

0800

Position	54 06.5S 63 20.8W	
Weather	Wind 15 kts from 310	Vis 10 NM
	Seastate 2 from 310	SSS 3
	Cloud 30 %	SVP not taken

1027

C/S 8 to close S42

1050

FCS (Poor) S 42 286/36 kyds 090/9 AOB 16 starboard

1115

CO COMMENT

From GOP S42 appears to have been steaming North at 10 knots over last few hours, at a range now of 70 kyds. Appears to be within 10 kyds of northern edge of Area MIGUEL. If this contact is part of TG 79.3 I expect her to 6/C South shortly.

1120

FCS (Poor) S 42 286/70 kyds 180/10 AOB 74 Port. She has altered to the South.

1130

Sunrise. Nothing visual within 10 kyds

1140

C/D 210 C/S 15 C/C 275

CO COMMENT

Decided to go deep and increase speed to 15 knots for 1 hour to get to Area MIGUEL for a search

1210

Entered Area MIGUEL

1249

C/D PD C/S 4 Visual search

1254


START EVENT 0101 - INITIAL CONTACT WITH TG 79.3

B - 285 R - 10 kyds S - 42 Unidentified Warship. Designated M - 02

1259

CO COMMENT

Five ships now in sight in fairly close formation. Disposition of the forces is



02 . FCS (AVERAGE) of Group 272/11 Kyds 130/8 AOB 38 Port

CO COMMENT

CONTACTS IDENTIFIED AS:-

T05 =	S42 =	M - 02	AO PUERTA DE ROSALES
	V56 =	M - 03	DD ALLEN SUMNER CLASS
		M - 04	CCL BELGRANO
		M - 05	DD ALLEN SUMNER CLASS

(DD's Probably BOUCHARD AND BUENA)

I have not seen the two masts to the left of M - 02/M - 04 again - possibly I was mistaken and there are only four contacts.

M - 02 and M - 04 appear to be RASTING.

322 Warner look - No Rackets

CO COMMENT

TG 79.3 is operating under a passive EMCON policy

325 C/C 350 to increase my distance off track from the TG.

329 FCS (GOOD) M - 03 191/4.1 Kyds 130/9 AOB 119 Port

335 FCS (GOOD) M - 04 193/5.1 kyds 155/10 AOB 142 Port

CO COMMENT

M - 03 has crossed in front of M - 04. The disposition is now such that there is a DD on either side of the CCL.

From set ups, the indication is an HIA of 120 -7. This will take TG 79.3 straight to the centre of Area JULIAN

Intention is to open out on the port quarter of the group and shadow

357 Warner clearance - No racket

CO COMMENT

Intention is to remain between 9 and 14 kyds from the group

412 B - 300 E - 63 I Band Racket 1 sweep only. No classification

1413 END EVENT 0101 - INITIAL CONTACT WITH TG 79.3

CO END OF EVENT SUMMARY

First contact with TG 79.3 was, in retrospect, T - 04 at 301645 last night. This was the diesel signature from M - 02 the AO, picked up at a range of approximately 100 Kyds. This coupled with the excellent intelligence support enabled me to gain visual contact at 1249 this afternoon.

TG 79.3 consists of CCL BELGRANO (M - 04)

DD's BOUCHARD AND BUENA (M - 03, M - 05)

AO PUERTA DE ROSALES (M - 02)

Possibly one tug

CCL BELGRANO and AO PUERTA DE ROSALES were RASING on first gaining visual contact which could account for the Groups slow SOA. The Group's course will take it straight to the centre of Area JULIAN

1425 M - 05 Black Smoke - possibly increasing speed, No indication from sonar.

1429 White Maroon seen above M - 04.

CO COMMENT

1. The white Maroon has not caused any change in the groups activity - perhaps it marks the end of the RAS?

2. VISUAL DESCRIPTION OF M - 02 PUERTA DE ROSALES

MKMF white superstructure, dark Hull, dark funnel, white king posts.

3. Diesel signature 645Hz, 36 Hz spacing indicates 6 cylinders 2 stroke engine.

4. From observation the TG does not appear to be conducting any form of zigzag

5. TG is 28 NM outside the TEZ.

1508 No response SSIKS.

1510 CO COMMENT

Have tried to clear a locating report on SSIKS - unsuccessful. Intend going deep to close the group to 7 kyds and then returning to PD. Assess HLA now 130/9.5

1514 C/D 200 C/S 15 C/C 130

1559 C/C 230 C/S 10 - 1936 Ranging Manoeuvre  
 FCS (Average) M02 142/13 kyds 130/13 AOB 168 Port

1605 C/C 115 C/S 15

1613 C/D PD

CO COMMENT

TG 79.3 are still in the same disposition at 12 kyds. MLA 130/13.5. Returned to PD in time to see AO break away returning to the NW. Remaining forces appear to have speeded up. They need 12 knots to get to Area JULI AN by 020200. Intention is to increase to 21 knots to close, deep.

1626 C/D 200 C/S 21.

1705 M03's range now 7 kyds. C/D PD for visual set up.

1710 CO COMMENT

Disposition unchanged at 12 kyds - MLA 130/12.

1725 C/D 200 C/S 16  
 Intend closing deep to 7 kyds

1840 All contacts faded - possibly due to group slowing down  
 C/D PD for visual set ups

CO COMMENT

Disposition unchanged at 12 kyds. MLA 130/12

1925 No success on SSIKS  
 Weather: Wind 15 knots from 300 Vis 10 NM  
 Seastate 2 from 300 SSS 2  
 Cloud 30% SVP not taken

1930 C/D 200 C/S 20

2000 Position 54 47S 62 57W  
 Weather as at 1925

2007 C/S 16 to refine FCS  
 Disposition and MLA unchanged

2016 C/C 080 for 1936 Range and FCS (Average)

M - 04 - 102/6 kyds 130/12 AOB 152 Stbd  
 M - 03 - 078/9.5 kyds 130/12 AOB 128 Stbd

2053 Sunset

2055 C/D PD

FCS (GOOD) M - 03 080/8 kyds 130/12 AOB 130 stbd  
 M - 04 122/7.5 kyds 130/12 AOB 172 Stbd  
 M - 05 167/5 kyds 130/12 AOB 143 Port

2130 TG 79.3 are not burning Navigation lights. Lost visually.

2141 C/D 200 C/S 21

Intention is to close to 9 kyds and then C/C and C/S for 1936 range.

2210 C/D 260 O/C Domestic

2224 C/C 180 - ranging manoeuvre

FCS (Average) M - 03 131/12 kyds 130/12 AOB Right Astern

2250 FCS (Average) M - 04 156/6 kyds 110/13 AOB 134 Port

2312 B - 150. 2 Bangs heard from M - 04, Cause unknown

2315 FCS (Good) M - 04 159/8 kyds 120/13 AOB 141 Port

2359 CO DAILY SUMMARY

Having followed the 'steer' from my intelligence support and Tonal 05, I at last gained visual contact on TG 79.3 at 1250 this afternoon.

I have remained in the trail for the last 11 hours. TG 79.3 have maintained an MLA in keeping with that suggested by my intelligence support which has been of great assistance.


TG 79.3 are not burning Navigational lights so I shall maintain the trail from deep - ready to conduct a TIGERFISH Attack should TG 79.3 head north into the TEZ.

A good day - in contact with the Enemy at last!

010000 - 020000

N.

16.793.



168  
1 INCH = 168 FT.

SUNDAY 2 MAY 1982

0017 C/C and C/S as required for 1936 ranging manoeuvres on M - 04  
FCS (Average) 196/16 kyds + 25 Kyds 130/15 AOB 114 Stbd

0035 B - 161 M - 04 appears to have stopped

0037 B - 161 M - 04 regained faint aural revs constant 130

CO COMMENT

It appears that TG 79.3 have altered course - perhaps to the NE to close the TEZ as expected. I appear to be in a bow null on M - 04.

0044 C/C 250 to open DOT

0055 M - 04 faded

0107 M - 05 FCS (Poor) LOP 150/7 kyds 000/14 AOB 30 port  
TCC 163/127 kyds 013/15 AOB 30 Port

CO COMMENT

I think TG 79.3 may well have reversed course to approximately 300. This puts me underfoot, as I had expected them to head North and was well placed on the port quarter for such a manoeuvre.

0110 M - 05 FCS (poor) 137/4 kyds 295/14 AOB 22 Stbd  
C/C 180 to get to the South of the group

0120 C/C 080 for 1936 range

0125 CO COMMENT

Having C/C 080 to open DOT and produce a fast right bearing rate, the Bearing did not move which means that TG 79.3 must be at long range. From the LOP it would appear that the Group did alter to the North as originally thought, but then resumed its original course of 130 at 14 kts, which would account for their long range. Intention is to C/S 21 and run down the bearing for 40 minutes steering 110 to offset myself to the North. I believe the Group is now 20 kyds to the SE.

0125 C/S 21 C/C 110

0205 C/S 12

0210 B - 080 M - 03  
 B - 098 M - 04  
 B - 120 M - 05

CO COMMENT

TG 79.3 regained to the SE, range 14 kyds approximately. Intention is to close at 21 knots for a further 30 minutes pointing the left wing escort. If the group change course to the North I shall be well placed.

0217 M - 03 FCS (Poor) 120/14 kyds 100/14 AOB 160 Port  
 C/S 21 C/C 080

0245 C/S 10  
 C/C as required for 1936 ranging. TG 79.3 now at 6 kyds

0320 CO COMMENT

Expected TG to turn to the North in accordance with COR 160 but they appear to be skirting the TEZ 18 miles to the south of it.

0350 M - 04 FCS (Average) 142/10.4 kyds 100/14 AOB 136 Port

0400 CO COMMENT

14 hours or so in the trail now shows that TG 79.3 are transitting East skirting the TEZ at 20 NM - speed about 13 knots overall. Passive with very little overall alteration. Have been trailing at ranges of between 4 and 20 kyds at speeds up to 21 knots. Cruiser is held quite easily inside 14 kyds and her Destroyers inside 10 kyds.

0500 M - 04 FCS (Average) 120/3.6 kyds 090/12.5 AOB 150 Port

0530 C/D PD C/S 5 Routine, Fix and Domestic  
 Nothing visual TG 79.3 obviously in darkened ship routine

0602 B - 140, E - 49 2 sweeps I band from M - 05 Possibly for station keeping

0645 C/D 260 C/S 211 to close TG 79.3 for 30 minutes.

CO COMMENT

0530 - 0645 - At PD to clear LR 1/2, but signals read on HF Broadcast, channel 5 and BILAT! Only signal down I believe is COR 167

Received COR 168 - AM FORMOSA from FI to mainland - well to the North of me.

COR 171 - Suggests that TG 79.3 will move to 54S 60W - bears 325/90 NI by first light. They won't make it. Aim is to attack RN Units.

0715

C/S 16

0720

M - 04 B - 126  
M - 03(or 05) B - 083

0745CO COMMENT

I have now caught up with BELGRANO (M - 04). Intend staying about 5 kyds astern of her awaiting developments.

0800

Position: 55 20.2S 58.24W  
Weather - Deep SSS 3 - 4  
SVP 060 - 4825  
260 - 4826

0810

M - 04 FCS (Average) 348/3.8 kyds 335/15 AOB 173 Stbd

CO COMMENT

TG 79.3 appears to have C/C to the NW.

0840

M - 04 FCS (Poor) 320/1.5 kyds 280/15 AOB 140 Stbd  
TG 79.3 appear to have started zigzagging

C/C as required for 1936 ranging

0900CO COMMENT

TG 79.3 have C/C back to about 270 rather than into the TEZ! SAD.

0922 M - 04 FCS (Average) 313/1.7 kyds 270/17 AOB 137 Port  
Speed from LOP is 14 knots

0930 Suspect S63 may be BELGRANO, being masked by M - 03.

CO COMMENT

Last night M - 03 and M - 05, the two destroyers, were at approximately 160 revs and M - 04, BELGRANO was at 130 when the group was making good 14 knots. The Group is still making good 14 knots, but the contact designated M - 04 is doing 168 revs. I think this is a destroyer and the two contacts got mixed up during the last sprint.

1106 LOP solution over last 2 hours 270/14


1124 Sunrise

1135 M - 04 FCS (Average) 306/0.9 kyds 270/14 AOB 94 Port

1144 B - 247.S71 - 2 X 4 = M - 05

CO COMMENT

Force Disposition



The Task Group is transitting West 15 NM to the South of the TEZ. Although intelligence suggests that the group will enter the TEZ, they appear to have a different idea. Perhaps the bombing of Stanley airfield and the 'splashing' of a mirage have made them wary of the TEZ!?

1246 M - 04 FCS (Good) 302/5.5 kyds 270/10 AOB 148 Port

1352 CO COMMENT

Intention is to return to PD in 15 minutes to check disposition of TG 79.3 visually and change a gearbox on Sector - a 15 minute job.

1410 C/D PD C/S 5  
M - 04 (BELGRANO) B & 220  
M - 03 (DD) B - 276

CO COMMENT

The contact we thought was the CC is one of the DD's - they must have changed over during the sprint at 0700

1420 Taking routine on Warner East  
 Weather Wind 15 knots from 310 Vis 5 IM  
 Seastate 2 from 310  
 Cloud 100%

1430 Disposition

1437 Very intermittent reception of FLTSATCOM 5

1452 M03/M05 appear to be operating their SPS 40 but not transmitting -  
 Scanners seem to be rotating - Nothing on Warner

1530 TG 79.3 are now at 12 kyds

1543 M05 B - 262/14 kyds. Appear to be changing station. Now 170/14.

1547 B - 248 E 01 I Band PRF 1627, PW 0.3 ARF 2. Not associated with TG.  
 Parameters are of a 1006, Kelvin Hughes, Decca Comnar. No sonar  
 contact on that bearing.

1625 M - 04 FCS(Good) 258/12 kyd 287/12 AOB 151 Port

CO COMMENT

Traffic now received. COR 177 gives me permission to Attack.  
 Delay due to confusion in that COR 174 cancelled an instruction (not  
 received) from CTG 317.8 to attack the Cruiser. DTG of COR 177 not  
 initially received and so awaited reruns to be absolutely certain.  
 I have ROE to attack. Aim now is to close TG 79.3 and then work into  
 a firing position.

Preferred weapon Mk 8 Mod 4. If a good attacking position cannot  
 be achieved because of the Escorts, then I shall use a Mk 24.

1626 C/D 160 C/S 16

1633 C/S 21 C/C 290

1701 C/D PD C/S 6  
M - 04 FCS 221/4.6 kyds 260/11 AOB 141 Stbd

1718 C/D 200 C/S 16

CO COMMENT

DD istoc close to firing position on CG Stbd side therefore my intention is to pass astern of BELGRANO and come up on her port side so that she is between me and the destroyers when I attack.

1745 C/D PD C/S 6 Vis is only 3 kyds

1755 M - 04 FCS (GOOD) 287/1.5 kyds 242/10 AOB 135 Port  
C/D 380 C/S 21 C/C 225 to obtain a good firing position

1809 ACTION STATIONS

1813 START EVENT 02/01 - ATTACK ON TG 79.3 - G BELGRANO

CO COMMENT

In position 55 23.1S 61 21.0W. I am on the port quarter of TG 79.3 and my target, the Cruiser G BELGRANO, is on the left wing. My intention is to close to a firing position such that I shall fire a salvo of 3 X Mk 8 Mod 4's from 1800 yds on a Torpedo Track Angle of 100° and a zero gyro angle. I shall then evade to the SE leaving the datum between me and the destroyers for as long as possible to assist my escape.

1816 C/D PD C/S 6

1820 M - 04 FCS (GOOD) 020/5.2 kyds 274/10 AOB 75 Port

CO COMMENT

Having come up for my final Target set up, M - 04 has zigged away and opened whilst I was deep. Intend going deep and fast to close into my firing position.

1822 C/D 300 C/S 21

1836 C/D PD C/S 8 C/C 040

1839 M - 04 FCS (GOOD) 045/4.5 kyds 274/10 AOB 48 Port

1843 M-04 FCS (GOOD) 040/35 kyds 294/10 AOB 75 Port

CO COMMENT

D.O.T. is 3.3 kyds. Will 'Duck and up' again to close range.

C/D 150 C/S 18

1850 C/C 000 C/S 6

1851 Set Target Speed 11 knots C/D PD  
Standby 1,2,6 tubes, open 1,2,6 tube bow caps

1852 C/C 010 - for a 105° Torpedo Track Angle (TTA)

1853 Final set-up

M04 FCS (GOOD) 042/2 kyds 280/11 AOB 58 PORT

1854 All-round look

CO COMMENT

Nothing else in sight. M-04 BELGRANO is not aware of my presence. Intend to wait until the target's relative bearing is G13 when it will be a zero gyro angle shot.

TTA now 90° after re-assessing the ATB at the last look, but will not C/C now as I am about to fire.

1854½ Final set-up

M-04 FCS (GOOD) 035/1.6 kyds 280/10½ AOB 65 PORT

Set target speed 10½ knots

1856 Final set-up

M-04 FCS (GOOD) 030/1.55 kyds 280/10½ AOB 70 PORT

1856¾ Check firing bearing 023½

FIRE

Order of firing 6, 1, 2

1857 Shut 1,2,6 tube bow caps

3 explosions heard

C/D 300 C/C 180 to clear the datum

Shut off for Counter-Attack

CO COMMENT

Orange fire-ball seen just aft of the centre of target, in line with the after mast, shortly after the first explosion was heard. Second explosion heard about 5 seconds after I think I saw a spurt of water aft, but it may have been smoke from the first. Third explosion heard but not seen - I was not looking!

1904 Explosions heard  
C/D 500 C/S 22

CO COMMENT

These explosions are possibly depth charges or some type of ASW weapon from the two destroyers M-03 and M-05. Datum is now 4 kyds to the NW of me.

1911 C/C 090

1917 C/C 060

1919 END OF EVENT 02/01

CO END OF EVENT SUMMARY

Having been in the trail of TG 79.3 for the last 24 hours, I had dropped astern of the group while reading my broadcast routine. On receipt of COR 177 authorising me to attack I went deep to close the group.

The intention was to close to an 'ideal' firing position on the side of the BELGRANO away from the escorting destroyers. A salvo of Mk 8 Mod 4's was considered better than a Mk 24 Mod 1, because of the BELGRANO's thick armour plating and anti torpedo bulges.

The Task Group were conducting a very limited zig zag plan of  $+ 30^\circ$  approximately around  $270^\circ$ . Having manoeuvred into a firing position on the port beam of the target, the parameters on firing were:

Own Course	010		
Own speed	6 kts		
Target Course	280	296 )	
Target speed	$10\frac{1}{2}$ knots	10 kts)	Reconstruction
Torpedo Track Angle	90	106 )	
Range on firing	1400 yds	1200 yd)	from the LOP
Gyro Angles	1st Weapon	$1^\circ$ Right	
	2nd Weapon	Zero	
	3rd Weapon	$2^\circ$ Left	
Angular Spacing	$5\frac{1}{2}$ degrees		
Hitting Run	56 seconds	-	$57\frac{1}{2}$ seconds timed on Sonar Recording

A 3 torpedo salvo was fired using Average Solutions because the poor visibility (3 kyds) made ATB assessment and ranging difficult. The command requirement was one hit. Onboard analysis, using both the visual solution from the final set up and the LOP Solution, gives two hits from the second and third weapons, with the first weapon missing astern. This is not supported by the visual sighting of a hit 57 seconds after discharge of the first weapon.

Replaying the Sonar Recording of the attack gives two definite explosions with a possible third, although this was not confirmed visually.

No Visual assessment of damage to the BELGRANO was possible because evasive action was taken to clear the area from the two escorting destroyers. The submarine was not detected throughout this event or at any other time.

1927 C/C 350. Datum B - 274 R - 18 kyds

1953 B - 280 S - 30 getting louder. There is a lot of 'banging' on this bearing

2000 Position . 55 42.6S 60 58.3W  
Weather - Deep  
SSS 6+  
SVP 020 - 4827  
420 - 4834

2004 B - 272 Datum R - 26 kyds

2010 Loud Bang - heard to the West - No Bearing

CO COMMENT

If this is the Destroyers chasing me they are either lucky in their choice of direction, or there happened to be a NEPTUNE in the local area with JEZ buoys that has directed them; because there have been no active transmissions at all. The 'Bangs' reported by the Sound Room sound like gun fire - is it BELGRANO's ammunition going off? Perhaps the 'Big Bang' was her magazine. Interval between first two 48 mins, second two 6 mins, so there is nothing significant.

2037 Sunset

2052

3 explosions heard to the West  
C/D 500 C/S 15 B - 260 S.30

CC COMMENT

S.30 to the West is 2 x 4, probably M-03 or M-05. I don't think these bangs are coming from the destroyers. Still no active transmissions, so there is no way that they could have contact on me. Perhaps there is an aircraft up there.

2059

C/C 130

2103

Loud explosions - appeared to be on the port side

2105

B - 265 Very loud noises - M-03 or M-05?  
C/C 150 C/S 23

2130CO COMMENT

Opened out 22 kyds to East of the Datum. Slowed to 6 knots prior to returning to PD. While I cleared stern arcs, both DDs were heard at 290 and 300, Mod loud - assessment, tracking East inside 10 kyds. I was just considering returning to PD for a look when 2 bangs were heard, Mod loud. Altered to East at 10 knots; 8 minutes later, 2 further sets of bangs - close! Inside 5 kyds by my assessment!

Increased to 23 knots and waded to SE for 1 hour. Nothing further heard,

Do not know what they might be - no helos seen. Perhaps aircraft dropping depth charges?? More probably, the DDs sweeping to East, guessing we went in that direction because the torpedoes came from the SE, and dropping the odd charge to drive me away - it did! Still no active transmissions.

RETROSPECTIVE COMMENT

Listening to the sonar recording of the loud bangs, run at half speed, gives 5 distinctive discharge noises prior to the loud explosions, which in turn are 5 separate explosions. The discharge noise sounds like a Limbo/Hedgehog type weapon, presumably on the DDs.

2158

C/D PD C/S 6 Transmit Sitrep 25/82. Fix, domestics.

2210

C/D 260 C/S 12 Opening to SE

2359

C/C 180

CO DAILY SUMMARY

Trailed TG 79.3 all night tracking outside TEZ to East. At 0805 reversed course to West. On return to PD at 1415, discovered that CC and DD had crossed over during reversal of course. Spent from then until 1620 obtaining traffic. COR 177 - Attack. Slightly garbled the first time.

1620-1900 - Closing to attack. Initially on the starboard side of G. BELGRANO (M-04) but DD was too close there, so crossed over to Port side to obtain a good firing position. 1900-2100 - spent evading to EAST and then SE. I still cannot understand why the explosions were so close. 2100-2359 - spent clearing the datum to SE.

Will move South and then West approximately 50 nm from the Datum before heading NW back to a search position off the Isla de los ESTADOS.

MONDAY 3 MAY 1982

0100 CO COMMENT

Overnight intentions are to move South and Northwest to operate half way between ESTADOS Isle and the firing Datum by pm tomorrow.

0103 No sonar contacts

0600 C/D PD C/S 6 Transmit Sitrep 26/82, Routine, Fix and domestics  
4 new signals required

0614 B - 030 E 58 Possible NEPTUNE

CO COMMENT

I would imagine the Neptune rockets are aircraft searching for me around the datum area.

0655 B - 050 E58 is increasing in intensity

0702 C/D 260 C/S 15

0800 Position 56 10S 62 34W  
SSS 4.5  
SVP 020 - 4827  
210 - 4832

0950 C/C 330 C/S 15 - Heading for Isla de Los Estados  
T - 06 (433 Hz) in after beams  
Diesel signature at 11.6 Hz spacing in low beams