



5. Once the aircraft had been successfully evacuated I feel that the C2 of TLZ ~~XXXXX~~ became disjointed and at times chaotic. This was due in part to the captain of ZH876 taking control of the Tac ATC radio with Tac ATC then focussing on the TLZ, inspecting for damage ~~XX XX XXXX XX XXXX~~. The presence of ~~2nd C130~~ added further confusion to this unfolding situation. Hindsight is a wonderful quality, but in a highly charged and dynamic situation, at night and with a burning aircraft in a hostile location, an element of "fog of war" is to be expected; I believe this is exactly what influenced the actions of several protagonists at this stage of the accident. The captain of ZH876 had convinced ~~XXXXX~~ that an ~~XXXXX XXX XXXX~~ was the cause of the accident and this introduced a perception that enemy action was not involved. ~~XXX~~ elected to use ~~XX XXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXX~~ to contact ~~2nd C130~~ and Al Udeid respectively, ~~XXXX XXXXX XX~~. However, ~~XXXX~~ states that downed crews are to make contact with coalition assets as expeditiously as possible; this is what the captain of ZH876 did and I applaud ~~XX~~ actions. Tac ATC was aware of another C-130 in the vicinity and elected to prepare the TLZ as best he could; this meant him relinquishing control of his radio and therefore the TLZ, but significantly without positively closing the TLZ. The captain of ~~2nd C130~~ was concerned for the safety of the crew and passengers of ZH876 based on recent experience of ~~XX XXXXX~~; hence he made the bold decision to land. However, throughout all of this the major factor was lack of control of the TLZ.

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6. The captain of ~~2nd C130~~ responded quickly and decisively to the events that were unfolding. For good reasons he decided to land at TLZ ~~XXXXXX~~ and offer all available assistance. He had been in contact with the TLZ, he was aware that the ~~XXXXXXX~~ the TLZ indicating that it was open, and when he lost comms he ~~XXXXXXX XXXX~~, as he was trained and qualified to do, and elected to perform a ~~XXXXXX~~ approach and landing. He was unaware of debris on the TLZ; furthermore, although Tac ATC heard metal on metal as ~~2nd C130~~ landed this information was not relayed to the captain, therefore he had no reason to suspect any damage to his aircraft. He performed, in his mind, another ~~XX XXXX XX~~ take-off and departure from TLZ ~~XXXXXX~~ and his actions in removing troops averted a major FP problem, as there would have been insufficient transport for the additional QRL and C-130 crew on the ground. Furthermore, in light of what he knew, it was reasonable for him to fly the subsequent sectors of his mission that night with standard turn-round procedures. Again, I am disappointed that the Board were unable to recognise the decisive actions of the captain and crew of ~~2nd C130~~.

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7. The loss of ZH876 bears many similarities with that of XV206 in Afghanistan last year, particularly FP associated with operations on TLZs. However, many lessons from XV206 have been acted upon, and the dissemination of that crew's experience was instrumental in the successful evacuation of ZH876.

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