



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

# Joint Doctrine Note 5/11

## Peacekeeping: An Evolving Role For Military Forces



## JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 5/11

# PEACEKEEPING: AN EVOLVING ROLE FOR MILITARY FORCES

Joint Doctrine Note 5/11 (JDN 5/11), dated July 2011,  
is promulgated  
as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Steve', written in a cursive style.

Head of Doctrine, Air and Space (Development, Concepts and Doctrine)

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## PREFACE

1. The purpose of this Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) is to provide a basis for debate in preparation for a formal review of extant UK doctrine on JWP 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*.<sup>1</sup> It will also help to inform an ongoing review of NATO doctrine on the same subject.<sup>2</sup> The note is purposefully limited in scope and therefore does not attempt to address all aspects of Peace Support Operations (PSO). Instead it will focus only on peacekeeping, as one of the major peace support activities involving military forces.

2. The doctrine note will first consider the contemporary peacekeeping environment before addressing some of the ambiguities that are present in current PSO terminology. It will then recommend a framework for future peacekeeping operations whether the mission is UN-led or not, and suggest where the UK may see its contribution beyond 2015.<sup>3</sup> The note will then address some principles for peacekeeping operations and consider the challenges in applying them to the contemporary environment. Finally the note will address one specific task, *the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence*. This is an area that continues to challenge UN peacekeeping missions and is not included in the extant UK doctrine on PSO.<sup>4</sup>

3. The JDN expands on an earlier DCDC discussion paper and workshop on peacekeeping.<sup>5</sup> The workshop brought together policymakers from: the FCO, DFID, MOD and a variety of humanitarian agencies; national and international academics; international think-tanks; plus military and civilian peacekeeping practitioners. The JDN has benefitted from a diverse set of perspectives; however, it does not provide a consensus.

4. The validation of the approach taken in this JDN will be determined by the debate that follows its publication. The debate must be a collaborative venture and therefore anyone wishing to contribute should contact DCDC.<sup>6</sup> Feedback and comments do not have to be constrained to this JDN only but can include any issue associated with military support to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building.

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> The intent would be to subsume JWP 3-50 into a single NATO publication.

<sup>3</sup> The UK could decide to act alone, as part of a bilateral arrangement or as part of a larger UN, NATO or EU mission.

<sup>4</sup> The UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr A Le Roy, stated in a speech at RUSI, 26 May 2011, that 2 of the key areas that continue to challenge peacekeeping operations are the *protection of civilians* and *deterrence*.

<sup>5</sup> A DCDC discussion paper, 28 February 2011 and Peacekeeping workshop, 7 April 2011.

<sup>6</sup> SO1 Thematic Doctrine 3, military 96161 4369, civilian 01793 314369, DCDC-THEMDOC3SO1@mod.uk.

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# PEACEKEEPING: AN EVOLVING ROLE FOR MILITARY FORCES

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## CHAPTER 1 – SETTING THE SCENE

### SECTION I – STABILISATION VERSUS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: THE NUANCE

101. The MOD's involvement in contemporary operations has been focused on supporting stabilisation operations.<sup>1</sup> As such it has not managed to keep pace with developments in the peacekeeping domain. Although there are overlaps between stabilisation and peacekeeping operations (which incorporate early peace-building activities), the 2 operational themes are quite different. The debate on how these and other operational themes are nested within a coherent conceptual framework is beyond the scope of this Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) and will be considered in a separate study.<sup>2</sup>

102. A peacekeeping mission is predicated on a peace agreement or ceasefire where a cessation of major violence has occurred. The peacekeeper fulfils a mandate with the strategic consent of the main warring parties, allowing a degree of freedom to fulfil its task in an impartial manner, while a sustainable peace settlement is pursued. Although each element of this ideal is never absolute, the underlying concept remains pertinent. Any coercive action by peacekeepers should be focused only on perpetrators in the act of contravening the mandate and then only as a last resort; the peacekeeper should not have a designated enemy. This is not necessarily the case in stabilisation operations where military forces may have the consent of the host nation government but no other warring party (Afghanistan: Taliban 2001 – present). A military force's ability to operate unhindered may be affected by irregular actors whose purpose is to undermine the government and those foreign actors that support it. A military force may decide in such situations that the defeat of a specific enemy is essential to the success of the operation.

103. The nuance between the military contribution to stabilisation and peacekeeping operations means that it is unhelpful to attempt to identify an approach that is common to both; the overarching peace process and the lack of an enemy focus are just some of the differences that dictate this stance. There is a requirement for a bespoke set of principles that underpin each type of operation, even though some will invariably be the same.

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<sup>1</sup> Stabilisation is defined, by the MOD, as *the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and infrastructure; promote political processes and government structures; and prepare for sustainable social and economic development* (Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution*).

<sup>2</sup> The study will be conducted by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) during the forthcoming review of JDP 3-40 (Late 2011).

## SECTION II – CONTEXT

### A Changing Peacekeeping Environment

104. The concept of peacekeeping has evolved since its inception when international military peacekeepers were called upon to fulfil pacific monitoring functions under Chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter, while 2 state actors brokered a peace agreement, a concept that is now commonly referred to as the *traditional* model.<sup>3</sup>

### The Contemporary Environment

105. The peacekeeping environment has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, presenting complex challenges for the military, civilian and police forces that constitute the modern peacekeeping community.<sup>4</sup> Today's peacekeeping environment presents peacekeepers with an array of complex challenges that require a multi-dimensional approach, not only in support of a peace agreement but also early peace-building activities.<sup>5</sup> On occasions peacekeepers may be called upon to implement directly or support peace-building tasks, such as demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programmes, the initial phases of security sector reform, policing, rule of law, and justice programmes.

106. The environment is likely to include a mixture of state and non-state actors who are party to the conflict such as national defence forces, illegal armed groups, local militias, criminals and possibly terrorists. These actors are likely to occupy the security vacuum as fragile states, often with insufficient capacity to perform the simplest of state functions, attempt to recover from conflict. Adherence to peace agreements and ceasefires will be less predictable than in the past. This is due, in part, to the uncertain nature of the contemporary peace process and the differing political interests of the warring parties as the struggle for post-conflict power ensues.

107. Conflict will continue to have an adverse affect on the local population, the effect of which will last beyond a formal ceasefire or peace agreement. Large numbers of the population may have been killed, abused or displaced as a result of fighting or from the insecurity that invariably follows conflict. Peacekeepers will often be authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use coercive force to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, intimating an element of resolve by the international community to

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<sup>3</sup> Chapter VI of the UN Charter refers to pacific settlement of disputes.

<sup>4</sup> For more detail see the World Development Report 2011.

<sup>5</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 2008 page 18: peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

intervene to protect basic human rights.<sup>6,7</sup> The need for peacekeepers to be prepared to threaten or use force to implement the mandate has never been more apparent.

108. Peacekeepers are likely to share the operating space with a UN *country team*, humanitarian actors and non-governmental organisations, many of whom will be working on similar issues, although each may be guided and motivated by different interests and mandates.<sup>8</sup> The environment is now one of complexity and uncertainty where peacekeepers and other international actors will need to work together better to provide the necessary conditions for a sustainable peace; the military component will continue to play a key role in this process.

### **The Peace Process**

109. A peace agreement is just the starting point of a long process that does not guarantee a cessation to all violence, but marks a point in time where some or all of the warring parties make a commitment to pursue a peaceful course to resolve conflict. An agreement may simply highlight a number of milestones that need to be addressed as the peace process develops. An example would be the 2002 Machakos Protocol, signed and agreed by the parties to the conflict in Sudan. The broad framework included:

*'setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan on state and religion. [The parties] also agreed to continue talks on the outstanding issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, and human rights'.<sup>9</sup>*

The framework above sets out ambitious targets all of which have potential to reignite old disputes and grievances, possibly resulting in violent activity. Warring parties may adopt spoiling behaviour as a tactic at some point to achieve political goals; however, this should not automatically label them as unequivocally opposed to the peace process.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Chapter VII gives the UN Security Council the right to authorise the use of force when international peace and security is threatened.

<sup>7</sup> A lack of political resolve has been a matter of criticism in the past (UNPROFOR: Srebrenica, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> The UN Country Team is separate from the UN mission and comprises the organisation's agencies, funds and programmes, e.g. United Nations High Commission for Refugees or United Nations Development Programme, etc.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml>.

<sup>10</sup> March 2010, one-day seminar co-hosted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and London School of Economics and Political Science. Using the term 'spoiling behaviour' acknowledges that a party adopting such tactics is not necessarily opposed to peace. (this does not represent the position of either organisation).

110. Continual disruption should be expected even after an agreement has been signed by the main warring parties to the conflict (DRC, 2008).<sup>11</sup> Agreements will be made that will not interest all armed actors all of the time and may even exclude certain parties to the conflict. Peacekeepers must have an understanding of the fluidity of political dynamics that embody the peace process they support. Understanding the intricacies of the process will help peacekeepers appreciate the need for tactical patience during what is often a long-term political process. The peacekeeper may know little about the detail as peacemaking discussions take place, but should be aware that the process will be surrounded by continued violence, mistrust, fear, hope and danger.<sup>12</sup>

### SECTION III – TERMINOLOGY

111. Current ambiguities in terminology between different military and civilian actors cause confusion as to what constitutes peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities and the relationship between the two. The UK should, where possible, support the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) guidelines for peacekeeping operations to help develop a shared understanding of the contemporary environment among the international community. This will go some way towards achieving a common understanding between other peacekeepers, which has to be a prerequisite to successful multi-agency operations.

#### Peacekeeping

112. The table below highlights the current terminology used by the UN DPKO and NATO to describe or define peacekeeping operations:

<b>UN DPKO Peacekeeping Description</b>
A technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragmented, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements (military, police and civilians) working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. <sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> United Nations officials reported at least 200 ceasefire violations in under 180 days following the signing of the Goma peace agreement in January 2008. [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org).

<sup>12</sup> Meyer-Knapp H, *Dangerous Peacemaking*, Peace Maker Press, page 165, 2003.

<sup>13</sup> *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, page 18, 2008. This document has not been endorsed by the UN membership, as such there may be many countries that interpret peacekeeping differently.

### NATO Peacekeeping Definition

A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self defence. (Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6)

113. The UN's description represents the changing peacekeeping environment. Contemporary peacekeepers find themselves assisting peacemakers in their efforts to reinforce agreed, but often fragile ceasefires or peace agreements in what is likely to be a volatile and chaotic environment.<sup>14</sup> Peacekeepers are likely to find themselves getting involved in early peace-building tasks as the situation progresses and conditions enable such activity.<sup>15</sup>

114. The NATO definition on the other hand no longer reflects the contemporary peacekeeping environment: first, it is optimistic to assume a high level of consent among all warring parties at all times; and second, it does not reflect accurately the need to be prepared to use force to implement the mandate.<sup>16</sup> The misrepresentation of the definition could have implications on the education and training for peacekeeping operations. This definition therefore, is more akin to the *traditional* Cold War peacekeeping model.

115. Because the NATO definition no longer satisfies the UK's understanding of peacekeeping, the MOD intends to adopt the definition below. This modification will be incorporated into Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1.<sup>17</sup>

*Peacekeeping is a technique designed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, however fragmented, where major hostility has halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.*

### Peace Enforcement

116. This doctrine note has already highlighted the changing peacekeeping environment where peacekeepers could be authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to use force at the tactical level to implement specific

<sup>14</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 2008, page 17. Peacemakers could be envoys, governments, groups of states, the UN, regional organisations, unofficial groups or a prominent personality working independently.

<sup>15</sup> *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, DPKO/DFS, New York, page 5, 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Being prepared to use force to implement the mandate is a principle of contemporary peacekeeping.

<sup>17</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*.

tasks in the mandate. The use of Chapter VII of the Charter rather than Chapter VI to invoke the resolve of the UNSC has changed the requirement placed on peacekeepers. This type of capability may have been referred to in the past as peace enforcement. However, it is now a function expected from all peacekeepers (commonly referred to as *robust* peacekeeping).<sup>18</sup> This changing emphasis requires peacekeepers to take a fresh look at how peace enforcement is now defined.

#### UN DPKO Peace Enforcement Definition

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorisation of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorised to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organisations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.<sup>19</sup>

#### NATO Peace Enforcement Definition

A peace support operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. The Peace Support Force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement impartially. (AAP-6)

117. The UN DPKO's Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations (2008) states that the line between *robust* peacekeeping and peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, but there are important differences between them. '*While peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host nation and/or the other main actors to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter unless authorised by the Security Council.*'<sup>20,21</sup>

118. Peace enforcement does not, therefore, require the consent of those parties involved in the conflict (Libya, 2011). It can be seen from the

<sup>18</sup> Robust peacekeeping is about having a capable force that understands what is required of it, supported by a coherent chain of command which can respond to changes as they occur, with the political backing of their government.

<sup>19</sup> *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, page 18, 2008.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, page 19.

<sup>21</sup> Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states '*that all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations*'.


description above that peace enforcement is not a technique that complements peacekeeping, but instead precedes it, or possibly replaces it if a peace process collapses. Peace enforcement often requires bespoke forces.

119. The NATO definition on the other hand makes a number of assumptions that do not reflect the UN DPKO version for peace enforcement, most notably that a ceasefire or peace agreement is in place. The extant NATO definition for peace enforcement is doing no more than defining *robust* peacekeeping, by assuming that a ceasefire or peace agreement is in place, and consent and compliance is evident to some degree.

120. The key point is that the UN DPKO and NATO's definition for peace enforcement are describing different techniques. The UN defines a technique that is distinct from contemporary peacekeeping, whereas NATO's is not. This ambiguity does not assist military forces and again impairs military education and training for such operations. The intent is to recommend that NATO's definition for peace enforcement be updated to reflect the UN DPKO version.

### The Relationship

121. The distinction between peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building is blurred; different operations will overlap as missions transition from one to another. Figure 1.1 provides a basic conceptual framework to help readers visualise when these types of operations are likely to take place in and around conflict.



**Figure 1.1 – Conceptual Framework**

## Peace Support Operations

122. The evolving concept of peace enforcement operations has meant that combining it with peacekeeping, under an overarching term *Peace Support Operations*, could add confusion rather than clarity to these distinct operations. Apart from *peace* in the title, there is little correlation between the 2 types of operation, except that one could possibly lead to the other. Both require different approaches based on different principles. It is fair to say that there is no longer utility in combining the 2 types of operation into a single doctrinal term.

123. Further consideration should therefore be given as to whether the UK should continue to pursue the term PSO or opt for a different term which reflects the environment more accurately, such as *military support to peace operations*. In so doing, it is proposed that *peace operations* should include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building. It is further proposed that peace enforcement should be considered apart from *peace operations* and instead considered alongside *intervention operations*.<sup>22</sup>

## SECTION IV – LIKELY UK INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING

124. The UK Government has stated that it intends to withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan by 2015. Institutional memory following over a decade of Counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq may affect Her Majesty's Government's (HMG) appetite for open-ended commitments for the foreseeable future. The Strategic Defence and Security Review states that greater focus will be placed on conflict prevention by identifying early warning and rapid response mechanisms that will help prevent conflict emerging.<sup>23</sup> Although the military lever of national power may have a role to play in this function, it is likely to utilise niche capabilities only, involving bespoke military resources. This would include Defence diplomacy, such as the defence attaché network and Royal Navy ship visits, military training teams and International Defence Training and Education.

125. Attempting to predict potential flash points around the world will be difficult to achieve and therefore strategic shocks will remain inevitable. Whether HMG decides to engage militarily in overseas missions will obviously remain the remit of the Government. However, politicians may be reluctant to commit large numbers of troops on peacekeeping operations when there is a risk of forces becoming tied to an operation without a clear exit strategy.

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<sup>22</sup> Action taken to exert influence over, modify or control a specific activity. (AAP 6)

<sup>23</sup> *Securing Britain in an Age of Insecurity*; Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010.

126. There are several options available to HMG that could support peacekeeping missions yet alleviate some of the risks mentioned above. These options include the utilisation of the UK's high-readiness military capability either in an early-entry or contingency peacekeeping role.<sup>24</sup> This capability, supplemented where appropriate with civilian and police expertise, would be able to react quickly and respond to ceasefires, or unexpected shocks in extant UN peacekeeping missions. Articulating and maintaining the political will to commit such capabilities could be in the UK's national interest, by strengthening its position on peacekeeping matters in the UNSC and enhancing relationships with its strategic partners.

### **Exploiting Niche Capabilities Post 2015**


127. A number of niche capabilities have been established in recent years that will have utility beyond Afghanistan, particularly in peacekeeping operations. The Military Stabilisation Support Group, the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit, Stabilisation Response Teams, and Female Engagement Teams are just some of the organisations that have been established to address new challenges facing military forces today. Retaining these capabilities may help to enhance the credibility and potency of a UK peacekeeping force. As the UK prepares to draw down its forces from Afghanistan it is important to identify how these capabilities can be re-aligned for future use. Other useful capabilities, traditionally lacking in UN peacekeeping operations include support helicopters, military intelligence, logistic support and field hospitals.

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<sup>24</sup> The UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr A Le Roy, stated in a speech at RUSI, 26 May 2011, that the UN lacks highly capable reserve forces.

## SECTION V – PEACEKEEPING FRAMEWORK

128. Figure 1.2 represents a framework where a ceasefire or peace arrangement has been initiated. The model focuses on peacekeeping predominantly; it highlights the possible requirement for an early-entry peacekeeping force, pending the arrival of a permanent force, or a distinct short-term contingency force to reinforce an extant peacekeeping mission.



### Explanatory Notes:

1. There is a requirement to either support an emerging or supplement an extant peacekeeping mission.
2. A UN Resolution authorising deployment of a peacekeeping force: limited objectives and duration.
3. A bespoke peacekeeping force deployed (a combination of military, civilian, and police personnel to fulfil the mandate).

### Figure 1.2 – Proposed Peacekeeping Framework

129. Contingency troops, by their very nature, need to be reactive and able to respond to crisis situations with limited notice. Peacekeepers fulfilling this task must have the requisite education, training, capability and understanding of peacekeeping operations to be effective.

## CHAPTER 2 – THE PRINCIPLES

201. There are a number of principles that embody peacekeeping which separate it from other types of operations.<sup>1</sup> The principles provide guidance to peacekeepers to help shape understanding of an overarching peace process, their role in that process and how their actions may support or undermine that process. Understanding the challenges associated with each principle will help shape the approach taken by peacekeepers.<sup>2</sup>

Consent
Impartiality
Minimum Force for Self Defence and the Implementation of the Mandate
Political Primacy
Legitimacy
Cause No Harm: Conflict-Sensitive Activity
An Integrated Approach

202. Extant UK Peace Support Operations (PSO) doctrine complicates rather than simplifies these principles by using terms such as *Campaign Authority* when more commonly-recognised terminology already exist among the peacekeeping community.<sup>3</sup> It is important as part of a peacekeeping force that, where possible, the UK uses international-recognised terminology that is clear, relevant and widely understood by other peacekeepers and humanitarian actors. The UN DPKO provides a basis from which the UK can develop a better understanding and highlight potential challenges for the military community.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The principles apply to any peacekeeping mission whether it is UN-led or not.

<sup>2</sup> Failure to respect the principles could result in the mission transitioning into something that is no longer peacekeeping.

<sup>3</sup> The term *campaign authority* appears in the Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, page 3-5, June 2004.

<sup>4</sup> *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, page 31, 2008.

## **Consent**

203. Peacekeeping operations are activated on the basis of having the strategic consent of the main parties to the conflict. This allows peacekeepers to carry out their mandate unimpeded while peacemakers work towards building a lasting peace settlement. Consent cannot be imposed on the warring parties, but must form the basis of a genuine desire and a will to enter into a peace process. That said, it is likely to be a dynamic process in which consent will invariably change by varying degrees over time and will have to be negotiated constantly between the peacemakers and warring parties.

204. Understanding why parties give their consent in the first place will help frame the political context, helping to assess the political interests of each party and whether their consent is likely to change over time as their motives change. Peacekeepers should be prepared to operate among warring parties whose consent at the tactical level may wane at times or be non-existent, simply because they were not part of the peace agreement.

205. Losing the consent of a significant party to the conflict could have a detrimental effect on achieving sustainable peace, possibly leading to violent activity and a breakdown in the peace process. Identifying indicators of dissatisfaction among warring parties in the peace process or peacekeeping mission should be brought to the attention of the mission's leadership so that mitigating action can be taken before consent is lost.

## **Impartiality**

206. Retaining impartiality will be a constant challenge for the contemporary peacekeeper. Demonstrating bias to any particular party or community places the peacekeeping force in a precarious situation, possibly calling their motives and hence impartiality into question.

207. Understanding how peacekeeping activities are perceived by other actors will be a constant struggle, albeit a necessary function. As challenging as this is, it is essential that peacekeepers do not confuse impartiality with neutrality. Although they should remain impartial in implementing the mandate, they must not be neutral and hence inactive against violations of the mandate. Peacekeepers should implement the mandate as a referee would a sports event. Regardless of the team, an act that contravenes the rules of the peace agreement or mandate should where possible be dealt with in a similar, consistent and transparent manner. It is the manner by which the peacekeeper fulfils the mandate that should be perceived as impartial.

208. There will be a number of challenges that peacekeepers face as they attempt to retain impartiality. Political direction from the UN Security Council

(UNSC) may result in peacekeepers aligning aspects of their activity with certain warring parties, e.g. the host-nation government. This is made more difficult when the host-nation government is also the perpetrator of human rights abuses. Finding a way to stop atrocities without provoking a withdrawal of consent will be a constant struggle for peacemakers and peacekeepers, one which should be addressed and reviewed constantly at the political level (MONUSCO, 2011).<sup>5</sup>

209. If there is a need to align activity with a particular party or community, the purpose for that alignment should be communicated with all interested parties in an attempt to avoid any misperceptions of the peacekeeping mission; this should be a task for the peacemakers, albeit complemented by the peacekeepers. Failing to maintain impartiality at the tactical level could affect not only the legitimacy of the peacekeepers but also inadvertently and unfairly empower one party over another.<sup>6</sup>

### **Minimum Force for Self Defence and the Implementation of the Mandate**

210. A UN mandate will specify the tasks that are to be fulfilled by a peacekeeping mission. It will specify where coercive force is authorised to fulfil a specific task, examples of which often include the protection of peacekeepers and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.<sup>7</sup> The mandate does not act as an order to the peacekeeper, so although it offers authorisation to use force in certain instances, its implementation depends on the troop contributing nations and mission leadership. Some UN troop contributing nations still find the notion of using force or adopting a robust posture during peacekeeping operations an anathema. However, the notion of the *non-use of force* is slowly being eroded through the efforts of the UN. The UN is pushing hard to promote the concept of *robust* peacekeeping as a requirement for all peacekeepers.<sup>8</sup>

211. Coercive force must only be in response to irregular activity that contravenes the mandate. It should be seen as a means of last resort and, where possible, having exhausted all other options. If needed though, the appropriate posture or directed force must be implemented in an impartial manner and proportional to achieve the desired effect. The de-escalation of

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<sup>5</sup> Instead of using force against Armed Force of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) troops in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the international community has pursued prosecutions against perpetrators of crimes, leading to a number of government soldiers being jailed.

<sup>6</sup> Berbal M, *Building Peace after War*, pages 109 -112, 2009.

<sup>7</sup> The civilian community includes the humanitarian community in this instance.

<sup>8</sup> The UN held a series of 3 conferences on *robust peacekeeping* in early 2011: Indonesia, Argentina, and South Africa.

force and posture and the continuation of a peaceful engagement should resume as soon as the threat has diminished.

212. Peacekeepers must understand the political ramifications of using coercive action without it unnecessarily constraining their ability to fulfil their tasks. An understanding of the political environment, both at the operational and tactical level, will make it that much easier for peacekeepers to act appropriately and in a timely manner to implement the mandate.

### **Political Primacy**

213. Peacekeeping operations are deployed as one part of a broader international effort to help countries emerging from conflict make the transition to a sustainable peace.<sup>9</sup> Achieving an enduring peace settlement which overcomes threats to peace and security is the overarching political goal which requires a political solution. It is for this reason that a peacekeeping mission usually has a civilian political lead. For example, a UN-led peacekeeping mission will normally be led by a Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) who has overall authority for the UN mission, including the military component.

214. Understanding the political environment is a necessary requirement of the contemporary peacekeeper. This will be a challenge for all peacekeepers as the peace process moves forward in a very dynamic and unpredictable way. Peacekeepers should retain flexible and agile planning processes that can be readjusted as the peace process develops.

### **Legitimacy**

215. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is an ongoing task that requires constant monitoring and assessment. Peacekeepers gain a certain degree of legitimacy by right of their status; however, they must develop and maintain it through the legitimacy of their actions.

216. Legitimacy can be achieved partially through peacekeepers fulfilling the mandate in a manner that reflects the principles. However, peacekeeping forces may be deemed illegitimate if they obstruct warring parties from achieving their political goals, expressed at times through violent activity. Perceptions of legitimacy will inevitably change over time, depending on: local conditions; political activity; peacekeepers' performance; and the expectations of the population and warring parties being met.

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<sup>9</sup> *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, page 22, 2008.

217. It is necessary that any peacekeeping operation is recognised as legitimate by the local population and parties to the conflict. Although international, regional and domestic legitimacy are essential, it is the indigenous audiences' perception of the peacekeeping force that will have the greatest impact on the mission's legitimacy.

218. Expectations of the population should be identified through local interaction and managed appropriately, with any risks mitigated by physical activity or alleviated through communication. Peacekeepers should not expect to hear just one voice speaking on behalf of the population and must take time to identify the representatives of the various communities; the difficulty of conducting such a task cannot be over stated.

### **Cause No Harm – Conflict-Sensitive Activity**

219. Peacekeeping deployments should ensure they do not conduct activities that have a detrimental affect on the peace process; gaining a political and social understanding of the operating environment is paramount in achieving this. The principle of *cause no harm* must be in the forefront of peacekeeping decision-makers' thoughts as they fulfil their mandate.

220. In-place peacekeepers and peace builders will most likely have been operating in an environment for some time before a contingency peacekeeping force deploys into the mission area and are likely to remain for a considerable time afterwards.<sup>10</sup> It would be arrogant and wrong for a military peacekeeper to ignore this enduring context. Thinking short term cannot be a viable option for a peacekeeper operating in a multi-agency mission, where the focus is naturally towards building long-term capacity to support an enduring and sustainable peace settlement. Harming the mission through inappropriate and misguided actions based on limited understanding must be avoided at all costs.

### **An Integrated Approach**

221. There are likely to be many local, regional and international peacekeeping and humanitarian actors operating in the same peacekeeping environment, each hoping to bring about enduring peace to a country or region. Ideally, each actor would align their planning with others, agree to a common course of action, prioritise their activities and share resources to effectively implement an agreed plan.

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<sup>10</sup> In-place peacekeepers refers to those peacekeepers supporting an enduring mission before a contingency force arrives.

222. Even when operating to an integrated plan, e.g. a UN-led peacekeeping operation,<sup>11</sup> organisations are likely to view common problems slightly differently, resulting in varied approaches shaped by different objectives, interests, culture, financial priorities, experience or simply intuition. These differences will not just affect the military/civilian relationship, but also the various intra-military relationships. Ignoring such differences will effect the degree to which co-ordination and integration of activity can be achieved.<sup>12</sup>

223. The intent of an integrated approach is to get people from different organisations and agencies to work side-by-side where possible, share information and ensure their perspectives and activities reinforce each other.<sup>13</sup> Building up relationships, with a genuine desire to work collaboratively, will benefit planning and the implementation of the mandate. Collaboration will reduce misunderstanding between the key stakeholders and ideally lead to better alignment or, at least, awareness of each others' activities.

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<sup>11</sup> UN-led missions work to an integrated plan.

<sup>12</sup> For further information, refer to Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 3/11 *Decision-making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors*.

<sup>13</sup> *Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified by the UK's Stabilisation Unit*, 2010.

## CHAPTER 3 – IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY

### SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING

301. *Understanding* is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making.<sup>1</sup> The depth of understanding that can be achieved before deploying to a peacekeeping mission area will depend on the resources available to collate information and the time available for commanders to assimilate it. It will be impossible for all UK military commanders to gain sufficient situational awareness of all potential deployment options across the globe. Instead, commanders should be immersed as soon as possible once Her Majesty's Government (HMG) has indicated intent to deploy a peacekeeping force. Utilising desk-level expertise from within government, independent subject matter experts, academia and supplementing it with information gained from in-place peacekeepers will provide the bedrock from which understanding can be developed.<sup>2</sup> Further analysis and judgement will provide the necessary foresight for effective decision-making. A peacekeeper will not be able to function effectively without a credible level of understanding of the mission's mandate, its purpose and the environment in which the mission is taking place. This section of the note will concentrate on understanding 3 aspects only: the political environment; the operating environment; and the other peacekeeping partners.

### SECTION II – UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

302. Peacekeepers and peace builders help maintain and develop the conditions necessary for peacemakers to pursue the complex transition from conflict to peace. Peacekeepers must understand the political dynamics behind any ceasefire or peace agreement and the mandate to ensure that their activities support rather than hinder the peace process. Planning and conducting effective activity therefore relies largely on the peacekeepers having a credible understanding of the political environment, ranging from the politics of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to that of local indigenous politicians or powerful elites.

303. Understanding the origins of a peacekeeping mission, and at whose request the mission was initiated, i.e. the UN, regional actors, a particular state, a non-state actor, or a combination thereof, will help determine the political interests, motivation and will of all concerned state and non-state actors involved in the peace process. This will help analysts predict the

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04 *Understanding*.

<sup>2</sup> Utilising tools such as the *Human Domain Framework* highlighted in JDP 04.

warring parties' level of consent and interests in having an international force intervene in what is often a domestic or regional dispute, and to what degree each will support or disrupt the peace process.

304. Understanding the political dynamics within the UNSC will also help determine how willing troop contributing nations will be to fulfil the mandate, e.g. not all countries agree to using force in a peacekeeping mission. It is important to note that a mandate is permissive, not prescriptive; it simply expresses the authority of the mission, but cannot act as an order to any troop contributing nation. It is assumed that HMG will only become involved in peacekeeping operations if it serves the national interest or where humanitarian needs are greatest. Understanding why the UK is committing its troops on operations overseas will provide a useful indicator to the extent the government wishes its military peacekeepers to become embroiled in fulfilling its mandate. This may be demonstrated further by the resources HMG allocates to the mission, and its willingness to accept British casualties. Other countries will commit their troops and police forces for similar reasons, and as such each peacekeeping contingent may fulfil the mandate in slightly different ways based on its own national interest.<sup>3</sup> The assumption that troop contributing nations will approach a peacekeeping mission in slightly different ways must be accepted and understood from the outset of any multi-national planning activity.

305. Retaining a sustained engagement with peacemakers and the troop contributing nation's political and military leadership will help develop a better understanding of the political dynamics that underpin the peacekeeping mission. Peacekeepers that understand these dynamics will be better placed to understand how their peacekeeping activities, whether intended or unintended, can affect the peace process.

## **SECTION III – UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT**

### **Institutional Memory**

306. The institutional memory gained from over a decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to influence UK military commanders for some time in the future;<sup>4</sup> a similar trend was seen following the UK's experience in Northern Ireland. However, peacekeeping will require a different approach and mindset from that adopted in the most recent campaigns. The use of force, a distinct enemy, and operating within a NATO or US-dominated structure are just some of the areas that are likely to be different in the

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<sup>3</sup> *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia*. Edited by Bierman and Vadset, Ashgate Publishing Limited, page 158, 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Following the UK withdrawal of combat forces by 2015.

contemporary peacekeeping environment. Training will have to reflect these differences; UK military forces cannot deploy personnel on peacekeeping that only understand war-fighting or counter-insurgency operations.

307. UK forces will have developed skills over the past decade that will complement the peacekeeping environment. Understanding the complexity of contemporary conflict and post-conflict environments, the necessity to operate among the population, working alongside and integrating activity with other actors, and the overall value of influence are just some of the many capabilities that a UK peacekeeping force will provide to a peacekeeping mission.

### **The Population**

308. There is a clear need for peacekeepers to have an effective understanding of the parties to the conflict, the local elites and the population. Understanding the motivations and intent of each group of actors may be difficult to achieve, especially since these may change as the peace process develops. Gaining such an understanding will require a great deal of interaction with other organisations (both nationally and in-country) to ensure a diverse perspective on the culture, history and politics of the region in question. Contingency peacekeeping forces must be adaptable enough to accommodate new ideas gained from in-place agencies and avoid building their own version of the truth; choosing to ignore local understanding could have an adverse effect on initial planning assumptions.

309. The population will have certain expectations of the peacekeeping mission. Peacekeepers deployed with a mandate to help keep the peace and protect populations from persecution are expected to do just that. Expectation management will be an ongoing task affecting all peacekeepers. Communicating with the population and other non-peacekeeping actors will be a necessary function of the mission leadership to ensure expectations are managed and that communities are aware of what the mission can and cannot do. It is important that peacekeepers' words match their deeds: promising deliverables without the necessary resources and resolve could damage the mission's legitimacy.

## **SECTION IV – UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING PARTNERS: COLLABORATIVE WORKING**

310. It is commonly accepted that unco-ordinated activity can lead to duplication of effort, a lack of trust between actors or worse, undermining each others' activities.<sup>5</sup> This can have a detrimental effect on the overall success of a mission, or part thereof. Measures to mitigate these outcomes should be identified at every opportunity in an attempt to achieve better integration and collaborative working.

311. It is the common ground that should be exploited by organisations, to bring different skill-sets together as well as prioritise and coordinate activity to achieve commonly agreed objectives. There will be areas where consensus cannot be achieved, in which case different organisations must learn to co-exist. Personality will play a key part in this process and as such military personnel with the requisite inter-personal skills and understanding of other parties should be chosen to perform this influential task. Demonstrating empathy rather than arrogance should contribute to the process; military personnel must know when to offer advice and when to take it.

312. Understanding how other UN, military and humanitarian actors operate will be a key stepping-stone to working collaboratively. Understanding the mission structures, the roles of the other military forces and civilian agencies, their cultures and how each fulfils its mandate is essential. Time taken to gain this understanding during pre-deployment preparations and the initial weeks of deployment will help to build more effective relationships.

### **Other Military Actors**

313. Early reconnaissance of a mission area by early-entry or contingency peacekeeping forces will enhance understanding of in-place military capability, both indigenous and international, to highlight any interoperability issues. The output from this analysis will help develop situational awareness and provide planners with the necessary information to begin thinking about transitioning security back to in-place forces once the early-entry or contingency peacekeeping force departs. Failure to recognise these issues early could lead to a situation where immediate gains are lost once a bespoke force withdraws because in-place military forces are unable to fill the vacuum left by a much more capable organisation.

314. A troop contribution nation's approach to peacekeeping, and thereby its behaviour, will be shaped by its interests, culture, history, training, resources, operational experience and even its interpretation of what constitutes

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<sup>5</sup> *Stabilisation Unit Lessons Summary Note*, November 2010.

peacekeeping. A particularly bad experience in one peacekeeping theatre may affect how a military component operates in another. Such experiences may lead a troop contributing nation to adopt a casualty-adverse approach where decisions are made at the highest level only, with the potential to affect a peacekeeper's ability to operate effectively in a complex environment.

315. UK military peacekeepers must acknowledge that other national military components may approach an operation in different ways. Recognising this assumption early allows sufficient time to gain better understanding on how these differences will affect the peacekeeping process. Ignoring this realisation until deployment could lead to unnecessary friction which at best results in an ineffective working relationship.

### **Sharing the Space with Humanitarian Actors**

316. Most humanitarian agencies work towards a set of core principles, which include amongst others: the humanitarian imperative comes first; aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone; and, aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.<sup>6</sup> Most agencies will attempt to maintain these principles by remaining impartial to local, regional or international politics.<sup>7</sup> Aid will be delivered in a predictable manner to those most in need and should be fully transparent. Humanitarian actors will have to try constantly to negotiate their legitimacy based on the perception of the local population, including those parties that oppose the peace process. Conducting these types of activities will invariably be unpredictable and potentially dangerous. The humanitarian community will most likely avoid direct interaction with any military force, regardless of nationality, to preserve their impartiality; the military must understand and accept this premise.

317. Military peacekeepers and humanitarian actors will be operating in the same space, often with overlapping interests, especially regarding the protection of civilians.

*Experience has shown that in almost all emergencies some level of co-ordination is required and that failure to establish effective and appropriate civil-military relations can have severe consequences both in current operations and in the later stages of the emergency.<sup>8</sup>*

Therefore a pragmatic approach needs to be adopted where possible. Many peacekeeping missions have bespoke protocols for such interaction, often co-

<sup>6</sup> *At a Crossroads: Humanitarianism for the Next Decade*, Save the Children, page1, 2010.

<sup>7</sup> There may be hundreds of humanitarian agencies operating in the same peacekeeping environment. Not all will necessarily adhere to the humanitarian principles.

<sup>8</sup> *United Nations Civil-Military Co-ordination Field Officer Handbook*, page 2, 2008.

ordinated through the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).<sup>9</sup> The success of any interaction in the mission will depend on the stance adopted by those actors at the operational and tactical level; understanding each others' role, prejudices and culture will assist this interaction. There will be some actors that will refuse any interaction; others may interact at various degrees and for different reasons, e.g. the protection of humanitarian convoys. The process of establishing dialogue may be fraught with friction and frustrations, however, military commanders should persevere since relationships are critical to creating the conditions for sustainable peace.

318. Relationships with the larger agencies can be established first in the UK to help better understand the humanitarian community and then developed further in-country, probably under the auspices of UN OCHA. It is suggested that a civilian humanitarian advisor be part of any UK military peacekeeping contingent to help with this interaction. Gaining humanitarian input into the military planning process will assist this interaction, especially in an environment where human security is a prevalent issue and a key element to long-term peace. Excluding key civilian actors from the planning process can lead to ineffective activity on the ground.

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<sup>9</sup> For example, local arrangements should be based on the *United Nations Civil-Military Co-ordination Field Officer Handbook*, 2008.

## **CHAPTER 4 – MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS<sup>1</sup>**

### **SECTION I – UN SECURITY COUNCIL THEMATIC PROTECTION RESOLUTIONS**

401. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has introduced a number of crosscutting thematic resolutions aimed specifically at protecting and supporting the most vulnerable groups in conflict and post-conflict environments, notably women and children.<sup>2</sup> Many elements of these thematic resolutions are incorporated into peacekeeping mission mandates, and as such should be understood by all peacekeepers.

402. UK peacekeeping forces must make themselves aware of any UK action plans or mission-specific implementation plans regarding these thematic resolutions.<sup>3</sup> Providing basic security, in support of these resolutions, will remain a key role for the peacekeeper and is covered in more depth in Section II.

### **SECTION II – PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS UNDER IMMINENT THREAT OF VIOLENCE**

403. The victims of war in the contemporary conflict environment are often civilians who are not only caught up in the crossfire of combat, but more often than not are targets of systematic violence. The following extract from the Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2010 - Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*,<sup>4</sup> highlights the problem facing peacekeepers in one particular conflict zone; however, the issue is prevalent in many more.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this note, civilians are defined as non-combatants; indigenous and international.

<sup>2</sup> Including UN Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1888 (2009) on women, peace and security; UN Resolution 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, and UN Resolution 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflict.

<sup>3</sup> For example, the UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security, 2010.

<sup>4</sup> Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2010 - Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*, 20 January 2010.

### Human Rights Watch Extract ( Democratic Republic of Congo)

Violence and brutal human rights abuses increased in the Democratic Republic of Congo throughout 2009. Two military campaigns by the Congolese army, in the east and north, resulted in a dramatic increase in violence against civilians by both rebel and government forces. At least 2,500 civilians were slaughtered, over 7,000 women and girls were raped, and more than 1 million people were forced to flee their homes. This pushed the total number of displaced people to over 2 million, the vast majority with limited or no access to humanitarian assistance, often forcing them to return to insecure areas to find food. United Nations peacekeepers supported Congolese army military operations and struggled to give meaning to their mandate to protect civilians.

404. The protection of civilians encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect of the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.<sup>5</sup> The UK, along with other members of the international community, has specific legal and moral obligations to ensure, where possible, civilians are not the target of physical attacks or subjected to acts of violence. The human rights sought by many within post-conflict peacekeeping environments are relatively basic: women and children feeling safe to collect water without the fear of being viciously raped; villagers free of fear from armed groups abducting their children, burning their houses and mutilating members of their community; there are too many examples to list them all. Separating the people from the effects of conflict is often impossible to achieve. It is for this reason that the task of protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence is included in most contemporary UN resolutions, often supported by Chapter VII of the UN Charter:<sup>6</sup> specific mention is usually given in the mandate of thematic resolutions that address the most vulnerable groups, including women and children.

405. The responsibility to protect the population during peacekeeping missions falls to the state in the first instance; when the state is unable or unwilling to do this it falls to peacekeepers to assist in providing this function

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<sup>5</sup> UK policy on the Protection of Civilians is contained in *UK Government Strategy on The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*.

<sup>6</sup> For example: UN Resolution 1739 (2007): Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations ..... 'To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment'.

while they and peace builders develop indigenous capacity. The UN has conceptualised the protection of civilians through 3 overlapping areas: a political process; physical protection; and the establishment of a protective environment.<sup>7</sup> Peacekeepers will have a vital role to play in providing protection, through physical security, social development, legal protection or other security-related programmes.<sup>8</sup> Such a response requires the effort of multiple agencies and hence an integrated response is necessary to tackle the problem effectively.

406. It is likely that a UN-led peacekeeping mission will nominate a civilian to co-ordinate an integrated approach to protect civilians.<sup>9</sup> It is from this lead that an integrated response is planned and implemented. Development of accountable and transparent security and legal structures are just some of the other projects working in tandem with the physical act of protecting civilians. Although the overall solution of *protection* requires a multi-agency response, there is probably a greater expectation from domestic and global audiences that military and police peacekeepers, working under a Chapter VII mandate, will provide the necessary protection for civilians under imminent threat of violence. Working with the local population to assess the risks they perceive as most threatening to them is a necessary, albeit challenging task. Achieving a consensual view of the local security needs will help inform protection plans, which will go some way to meet local expectations and gain local ownership.<sup>10</sup> The legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission may be questioned if peacekeepers are not seen to perform this protection function effectively (Abyei, Sudan: 2011).<sup>11</sup>

407. The military contribution to protecting civilians from physical violence is an integral part of an overall solution to protect civilians and therefore must be integrated with the overarching civilian-led planning process. It is essential that this integration takes place from the outset of planning activity to incorporate and recognise different actors' operating cultures, capabilities and constraints.

408. The approach taken to protect civilians against violence in a peacekeeping context may differ from a similar task in a Counter-insurgency (COIN) environment (Afghanistan, 2011). The approach adopted will most

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<sup>7</sup> Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/ Department of Field Support (DFS) Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2009.

<sup>8</sup> *Gendering the Security Sector: Protecting Civilians against Sexual and Gender Based Violence in the DRC*, Solhjell, 2010.

<sup>9</sup> Early-entry peacekeepers may have to initiate a bespoke approach based on their mandate.

<sup>10</sup> Jointly owned between the population and the peacekeeping mission.

<sup>11</sup> [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk), 6 June 2011: Based on a statement made by the DPKO Senior Military Adviser.

likely reflect the overarching effect being sought by the protector.<sup>12</sup> Whereas the purpose of protecting civilians in a COIN environment may be to reduce local support for the insurgent, in peacekeeping it is based on the moral imperative of protecting human rights and to help restore confidence in the overall peace process; as such, the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations is often used as a benchmark to gauge the success or failure of a mission (Rwanda, 1994). Therefore, approaches currently adopted in Afghanistan by NATO forces may be inappropriate for a peacekeeping mission.

409. The task of providing protection will be particularly resource-intensive and inevitably require more resources than are available to the mission. Such constraints need to be recognised early and addressed collectively among the peacekeeping community either through corraling resources with other actors, or prioritising the most vulnerable population centres. Prioritisation inherently means that the mission must accept risk elsewhere. Risk should be mitigated where possible through contingency planning, including the management of local expectations.

410. Protection tasks will be identified through the planning process, but the military component could expect to be involved with: physical protection tasks of the most vulnerable population areas; the establishment of, or support to, an effective reaction force; and support to the movement of humanitarian actors in non-permissive environments – plus many more.

## **The Challenges**

411. There will be a number of challenges facing the peacekeeper at the operational and tactical level of command. The first challenge is not to inadvertently be perceived as favoring one community over another. The decision-making process should focus peacekeepers' efforts on need alone. However, the most vulnerable may all come from a particular ethnic, religious, or other social group and therefore any support could be seen as partial by other elements of the community. Careful consideration should be given to such challenges and mitigated by dialogue with those affected most by the peacekeepers' approach and posture.

412. The second challenge is the decision to use coercive force impartially to protect civilians.<sup>13</sup> A credible understanding of the political environment, the mandate and the rules of engagement is vital to ensure a swift and appropriate response against perpetrators of violence against civilians. Any potential risks

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<sup>12</sup> Karsten F, *International Peacekeeping* Volume 17, Number 1, February 2010, page 52.

<sup>13</sup> As authorised by the mandate.

to the peace process associated with using coercive force, such as retaliatory violence or losing consent of a particular party should be continuously reviewed by the mission's political decision-makers. Any confusion or ambiguity in the direction provided to peacekeepers by the mission's leadership has the potential to affect the timely use of force at the tactical level, which could in turn affect the legitimacy of the mission and consent of certain parties.

413. The third challenge is the ability of the peacekeeper to deter or stop acts of violence that may not be large scale in nature and therefore much harder to detect and deter, such as rape. This issue poses a huge challenge to the *protection* element of peacekeeping, where the perpetual use of rape as a weapon of war undermines the peacekeeping community (Darfur, DRC, Ivory Coast).

414. The final challenge is the priority given to the task of *protecting civilians*. The protection of civilians will be one of the many tasks highlighted in the mandate. The mission's leadership will manage the priorities as they deem appropriate. Often the task of protecting civilians will come with a caveat of *within capabilities and operational area*, which could cause friction as expectations clash with conflicting priorities.

## **The Response**

415. It is important to note that peacekeepers cannot pursue offensive operations against likely perpetrators of crimes due to their impartial status, unless they are authorised to do so in the mandate. Notwithstanding this, the military force can, and should, take appropriate measures, based on good intelligence, to deter any party from committing violence in the first place, possibly through posture, performance or dialogue. The success of the military contribution to protecting civilians within peacekeeping operations will depend on a variety of factors forming a basis of understanding which, in the past, have been partially to blame for failures in conducting this high-profile task. The military contingent must:

- a. Understand, through education and pre-deployment training, what is meant by *protecting civilians* and the military role within that. The UN plans to provide comprehensive training modules to assist military contingents with this process.
- b. Deploy with sufficient resources to fulfill the mandate. However, this will not always be achievable. A debate on concentrating forces versus dispersing forces in the mission area is one that will need to be addressed.

- c. Deploy with an understanding of how Her Majesty's Government (HMG) wishes its peacekeepers to become involved in tasks that may require a robust response.
- d. Understand the local, regional and international political dynamics to determine the constraints placed on military peacekeepers, i.e. what peacekeepers can and cannot do.
- e. Understand the motives of the belligerent parties behind any violent attacks on civilians; to what extent are their motives political or criminal in nature?
- f. Assist in assessing the threat, in conjunction with other peacekeepers and civilian communities of those most vulnerable to attack; integrated planning will help consolidate resources to those most in need and generate a degree of local-ownership for any protection plan.
- g. Actively embrace effective integration, or at least co-existence, with other military and civilian counterparts.
- h. Assist in identifying and activating an effective monitoring and evaluation system that supports the development of a protection plan.<sup>14</sup>

416. Peacekeeping agencies should discuss the possible outcomes and any undesired effects that could be associated with a change in military posture among indigenous communities. The continual presence of military peacekeeping forces may make certain communities feel insecure, possibly believing that it may incite greater violence, or impact on humanitarian activities. The implications should be thought through and shared with all interested parties before a change in posture is implemented. Providing protection should be based on locally-influenced solutions that cater for local concerns.

417. Much work has been done by the UN and other associates recently in conceptualising *protection of civilians*, however, regular reports by human rights advocacy groups, e.g. Human Rights Watch, regularly provide evidence of continual failure by peacekeepers to meet local and international expectations.<sup>15</sup> There are many reasons for this, some of which have been highlighted above. However, peacekeepers and humanitarians that deploy with a better appreciation of the political environment, an understanding of the concept of *protection of civilians*, are resourced and trained effectively, have

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<sup>14</sup> More detail on planning in Chapter 5.

<sup>15</sup> [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org).

the will to fulfil the mandate, and a genuine wish to collaborate with other actors to protect human rights, will be well placed to assist in protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence. Ignoring or missing any one of these vital components will affect the overall outcome.

### **SECTION III – DETERRING ACTORS THAT SEEK TO INFLICT VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS**

418. Deterring and, sometimes, stopping warring parties from inflicting violence against civilians is one of many tasks given to peacekeepers. Peacekeepers should not be surprised when parties employ coercive tactics in pursuit of political goals; this behaviour may manifest itself in violence against civilians. There may be a number of reasons for this, some of which could include: despair of a party over the failure to implement the peace agreement; the exclusion of a particular party from the peace process; or simply the process no longer serves a parties' interests.<sup>16</sup> Placing parties into categories such as *spoiler* or *non-compliant actor* may unhelpfully label them as unequivocally opposed to peace and could adversely affect the way they are dealt with by the peacekeeping community.<sup>17</sup> Labelling actors in such a way fails to recognise the dynamic and fluid nature of the political environment, where goals will be pursued in a variety of ways as the competition for power ensues. This does not imply that there are no longer parties that are irreconcilable to the peace process and as such are genuine spoilers.<sup>18</sup> However, such specific labelling should be based on a thorough analysis of a party's objectives, motivations and incentives, all within a political context, and must be continuously reviewed.

419. There is a fine balance between engaging with and marginalising parties to the conflict. Identifying parties as spoilers has the potential to marginalise them, possibly leading to them being considered an enemy, something that does not fit within the peacekeeping concept. Peacekeepers must adopt an approach of dealing with warring parties that retains their impartial status even when parties adopt spoiling behaviour that attempts to undermine the peace process.

420. Peacekeepers need to initiate strategies to deal with violence that reflect the principles laid out earlier in this doctrine note. Maintaining impartiality and minimum force to fulfil the mandate requires a deterrence

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<sup>16</sup> *Contemporary Peacekeeping*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Steadman, page 147.

<sup>17</sup> Spoilers are leaders who believe that peace threatens power, world view and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. *International Security, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes*, Volume 22, page 5, Steadman, Fall 1997.

<sup>18</sup> JDP 04 *Understanding*, page 3-10.

posture, albeit one with an offensive spirit. This is a posture that enables the peacekeeping force to fulfil its mandate, while clearly expressing its capability and intent to use coercive force when needed. Demonstrating the capability and intent of the peacekeeping mission to use coercive force is a crucial factor in deterring an actor from conducting violent action; potential perpetrators may attempt to exploit instances where such deterrence does not exist.

## Understanding the Perpetrators

421. Peacekeepers should develop integrated strategies and plans to address spoiling behaviour against the civilian community. Spoiling behaviour may be transient in nature or enduring; analysis of the political environment will help gauge a party's intent. Peacekeepers must identify the potential perpetrators that seek to undermine or influence the peace process through violent action. Credible intelligence will help develop a stakeholder analysis of those actors that have the interests, capability and intent to inflict violence on another group.<sup>19</sup> Gauging the likelihood of this type of tactic, against the impact it could have on the peace process, will help categorise the potential perpetrators and assist in prioritising resources into an integrated protection plan. Addressing some simple questions will help build up the necessary information to make preliminary assessments:

a. **What are the parties' interests, motivations, and capabilities?**

A detailed analysis will help develop an understanding of how parties may behave within the political context that underpins the transition from conflict to peace.

b. **How have the parties interacted with peacekeepers to date?**

This is particularly pertinent to a peacekeeping commander who is deploying in support of an on-going peacekeeping mission. Identifying certain trends pertaining to a group's behaviour may indicate future intent.

c. **Who are the potential perpetrators of violence against civilians?**

A stakeholder analysis will help identify those parties to the conflict who not only have the capability, but also the will and intent to inflict violence against civilians. Prioritisation by group and geographical area will help determine where the priority for protecting civilians may lie.

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<sup>19</sup> Intelligence must be integrated with other peacekeeping and humanitarian actors (where possible).

- d. **What indicators would warn of a possible shift in party consent and behaviour?** Indicators that demonstrate a shift in a party's approach to achieving its political goals should be identified. A warning system should be incorporated to alert the peacekeeping leadership, and a response mechanism established to support such warnings, e.g. a mobile reaction force.
- e. **What measures are required in response to the threat?** Appropriate protection measures should be integrated with all peacekeepers, humanitarians, host-government forces (unless they too are perpetrators of violence against civilians) and the affected population. Responding to a threat could incorporate a mixture of dialogue, posturing, and as a last resort, coercive action.
- f. **What are the likely risks and how can they be mitigated and managed?** Invariably there will be insufficient resources to fulfil all tasks listed in the mandate. Establish the priority of a protection task against other tasks. Identifying potential areas of risks and managing them accordingly will be a critical part of any protection plan.

422. There are a number of analytical tools that could assist peacekeeping planners to understand better the dynamics surrounding an actors' political goals and the environment in which they operate. It is important that any analytical tool is applicable to a peacekeeping environment, where there is no enemy to defeat, but instead parties to deter. Adapting the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) model may provide one option for such analysis. The benefit of the SWOT analysis is that it allows the analyst to consider not only the capabilities of a specific party, but also the political context in which it is operating. The purpose of the analysis is to identify how parties may chose to operate to achieve a specific political objective, e.g. when it believes that it is being misrepresented or excluded from the peace process. In such instances an actor may resort to *inflicting violence on civilians* to achieve its aim.

423. An in-depth analysis must be based on integrated intelligence that provides the internal dynamics of a particular party. Analysis of this nature should be prioritised on those parties that demonstrate the capability and intent to conduct such violence in pursuit of wider political goals; stakeholder analysis would be needed to identify which parties are most likely to fit this category. The next stage would be to consider the environment in which the actor operates. There are a number of ways to achieve this, one of which is to use the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information (PMESI) model which

considers various domains and their interactions within a specified environment.<sup>20</sup> The final stage would be to bring the 2 areas of analysis together to consider how parties would use their strengths and weaknesses to exploit the environment in which they operate. An example of such analysis is at Figure 4.1

## Pre-Deployment Preparation

424. Peacekeepers must be educated, trained, resourced and prepared to protect civilians against those actors who seek to undermine or influence the peace process through violence.<sup>21,22</sup> Troop and police contributing nations should be willing to fulfil this responsibility, possibly taking casualties in the process; however, history would suggest that not all nations will be willing to do this, especially if the mission does not align to its national interest.<sup>23</sup> Having a knowledge of the international political context prior to deploying on a peacekeeping mission will help military commanders understand how peacekeeping forces, including the UK, will react when faced with violations against the mandate. Certain armies will chose to abdicate their duties.<sup>24</sup> The same failings can be seen in contemporary missions today (UNMIS, 2011).

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<sup>20</sup> Other options include the *Human Domain Framework*, outlined in JDP 04.

<sup>21</sup> Brahimi Report, Part 2, paragraph 55.

<sup>22</sup> When authorised to do so by the UN Security Council.

<sup>23</sup> *Contemporary Peacekeeping*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, page 170.

<sup>24</sup> European Commission: *Faster and More United?* The debate about Europe's Crisis Response Capacity, May 2007, Chapter 12: Operation ARTIMIS in DRC; Major-General Kees Homan, page 152.

**Party's objective:** to bring fear among civilians by inflicting violence.

**Notes:**

1. Unlike centre of gravity analysis, this model keeps the fundamental peacekeeping principles in mind at all times, e.g. there is no enemy to conduct pre-emptive offensive operations against. The focus must be on deterrence.
2. The model will require in-depth intelligence utilising all sources within the peacekeeping mission.

		Assess Capabilities and Capacity of the Party to Achieve its Objective	
		Strengths	Weaknesses
		<p><i>What internal strengths does a party have to fulfil its objective? E.g:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group ideology</li> <li>• Leadership</li> <li>• Weaponry</li> </ul>	<p><i>What internal weakness does a party have that would hamper its ability to fulfil its objective? E.g:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fractured command/ideology</li> <li>• Lack of mobility</li> <li>• Lack of funds</li> </ul>
		Integrated Planning Considerations	
Opportunities	<p><i>What factors from an analysis of the external environment, e.g. PMESI, can be exploited by the group to fulfil its objective? E.g:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Certain areas inaccessible by peacekeepers</li> <li>• Host-government forces ineffective</li> <li>• Regional political actor supportive of spoiling behaviour</li> <li>• Safe havens available in certain communities that support the political motives of the party</li> </ul>	<p><b>Strengths/Opportunities Analysis</b></p> <p>Analysis of strengths and opportunities will provide insight into where the threat is most dangerous.</p> <p>Risks should be identified and deterrence measures taken to mitigate them where possible. E.g., warning systems and reaction forces.</p>	<p><b>Weaknesses/Opportunities Analysis</b></p> <p>Weaknesses should be exploited by the peacekeepers wherever possible, in a way to deter violent activity.</p> <p>Indicators could be initiated that monitor whether weaknesses become strengths over time.</p>
Threats	<p><i>What factors from an analysis of the external environment, e.g. PMESI, can threaten the group from fulfilling its objective? E.g:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Certain areas dominated by credible peacekeepers</li> <li>• Host-government forces operating in the area</li> <li>• Lack of political support from regional actors</li> </ul>	<p><b>Strengths/Threats Analysis</b></p> <p>Perpetrators will most likely avoid these areas.</p> <p>Be cautious when considering the re-distribution of peacekeeping resources. Diluting the environmental threats may make them future opportunities.</p>	<p><b>Weaknesses/Threats Analysis</b></p> <p>Perpetrators will most likely avoid these areas.</p> <p>Continue to monitor any changes in the factors represented in these 2 categories.</p>

**Figure 4.1 – SWOT Analysis**

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## CHAPTER 5 – PLANNING IMPLICATIONS

501. The complex and diverse nature of the peacekeeping environment offer little in terms of predictable behaviours, attitudes and outcomes to political activity (where consent and perceptions constantly change). This makes it difficult to base planning on a rigid foundation of understanding through which to determine accurately a plan that guides a force from initial deployment to the fulfilment of its objectives. Planning for such an environment, by its very nature, requires an approach that is flexible, adaptable and agile.


502. Planning models conceived during the Cold War do not necessarily cater for the complexity of the contemporary peacekeeping environment. A predictable belligerent enables a commander to pre-empt any contravening activity thereby gaining the initiative and providing him a better chance of success. Parties that demonstrate spoiling behaviour in today's peacekeeping environment are less predictable; they are unlikely to have doctrine for us to study and their culture and rationale will invariably be different to ours. Military organisations should be careful not to become too focused on what they perceive as predictable outcomes and their own efficiency and performance in achieving those outcomes, i.e. pursuing a wrong course of action, albeit in a credible manner. The unpredictable nature of the peacekeeping environment means that plans must be reviewed continually and re-adjusted in support of the overarching peace process and, where applicable, the in-place mission plan.

503. Early-entry or contingency peacekeeping operations will probably be constrained by the mission's mandate, the political dynamics that encompass the peace process and limited resources, which may affect a planners' ability to test planning assumptions before deployment. It is highly likely that a number of assumptions made during the initial planning process will be flawed, either because information was lacking, incomplete, or simply ignored. As a result, planners must be able to access and reflect on their original planning analysis with ease, to understand why their thought process (their logic) led them down a specific path; i.e. why planners believed that certain activities would produce a certain effect. The thought process should be physically recorded in a format that is easily accessible to planning staff, throughout the operation and to follow-on forces, to enable evaluation of the plan to take place.

504. The recorded theory (of change) provides a baseline from which an evaluation of a plan can be initiated as the peacekeeper's understanding of the problem and environment develops. Monitoring and evaluation provides

the basis for this assessment.<sup>1</sup> Gaining sufficient behavioural-based data over a short-term deployment will be extremely difficult, and planners may have to base decisions on quantitative more than qualitative data. The sharing of information and data with other peacekeeping and compliant humanitarian actors will help mitigate some of these difficulties.

505. As an **example**, the military commander will want to evaluate his plan throughout the peacekeeping mission to consider whether the effects he hoped for are being achieved.<sup>2</sup> By having a formal record of the original logic trail, the commander and his staff are better placed to refer back to the original assumptions that provided the basis for early decision-making. As understanding matures and develops, commanders can test assumptions and alter their plans as necessary. Figure 5.1 provides a simple example to demonstrate this concept (starting at the *effect* and working clockwise).



**Figure 5.1 – Concept Example**

<sup>1</sup> A Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) on *Monitoring and Evaluation* is due to be published later this year.

<sup>2</sup> An example would be the Joint Effects Management process.

## **CONCLUSION**

It is now timely to review the UK's military doctrine for peace operations. The doctrine must help reduce the ambiguity that is currently present in the peacekeeping environment. It should contain principles that align, where possible, with the UN and other international actors and reflect today's peacekeeping missions. The doctrine needs to highlight the current challenges facing military peacekeepers and the implications of those challenges. The challenges are complex and difficult to overcome; a decade of fighting an intense counter-insurgency operation will leave an institutional memory that may influence UK political and military decision-making. Future peace operations' doctrine must highlight this as best as possible, thereby shaping education and training for the foreseeable future. This doctrine note simply acts as a start point, highlighting only some of the issues, from which a comprehensive publication can be developed.

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## LEXICON

### PART 1 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FET	Female Engagement Team
FARDC	Armed Force of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
JDN	Joint Doctrine Note
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication <sup>1</sup>
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMESI	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary General
SRT	Stabilisation Response Team
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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<sup>1</sup> JWPs have been named JDPs since 2005.

## **PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

### **peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, however fragmented, where major hostility has halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. (JDN 5/11)

## JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in JDPs.<sup>1</sup> From time to time, Interim JDPs (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed through Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). To ensure timeliness, they are not subject to the rigorous staffing processes applied to JDPs, particularly in terms of formal external approval. Raised by the DCDC, they seek to capture and disseminate best practice or articulate doctrinal solutions which can subsequently be developed in due course as more formal doctrine. Alternatively, a JDN may be issued to place some doctrinal markers in the sand, around which subsequent debate can centre.

Details of the joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 *Joint Doctrine Development Handbook*.

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<sup>1</sup> Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

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