




recommendation that Tac ATC SOPs be expanded to give proper consideration to the operational environment.

4. Although the co-pilot executing the landing of ZH876 had no bearing on the incident, the fact that he was the handling pilot (when SOPs required the aircraft captain to be the pilot flying) merits comment. Whilst accepting the AOC's view that there is not an endemic problem with adherence to procedures, the Board has established that such practice was not confined solely to this crew (the likely motivation being the belief that the policy had a detrimental effect on improving co-pilot ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~). This may be so, but the policy clearly existed for a reason – notably limitations on time and resources to instruct co-pilots in the discipline. Here I am unequivocal as CINC – if a policy (ie a flying regulation) requires amendment then it should be formally challenged. But, in the meantime, it must be obeyed (although I note that, in this particular case, the issue has now been addressed).

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5. No-one can foresee all possible negative outcomes to a complicated dynamic event and mitigate them all. This is true generally, but nowhere more so than in the prosecution of a counter insurgency operation against a determined enemy. Therefore, it is imperative that we learn lessons and implement measures that will deny our opponents any advantage. This loss bears similar circumstances to those surrounded that of XV206 at Lashkar Gar (24 May 06) which resulted in a recommendation leading to the issue of more detailed TTPs for TLZ clearance. However, in the case of ZH876, it is clear that these had not yet been fully addressed in training nor, consequently, robustly implemented on the night of 12 Feb 07. Armed with the measures described by CJO in conjunction with implementation of the Board's recommendations, we should be better prepared in this inherently high-risk area of business.



Sir Clive Loader  
Air Chief Marshal  
Commander-in-Chief Air Command

17 December 2007