



# Operations in the UK: A Guide for Civil Responders

Joint Doctrine Publication 02  
(2nd Edition) - Addendum

# **THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO UK RESILIENCE: A GUIDE FOR CIVIL RESPONDERS**

*This guide is an addendum to the Joint Defence Publication 02 (JDP 02) Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). It addresses military activities in the UK in support of the Civil Responders under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). Its aim is to inform a broad civilian readership of the nature, planning and conduct of MACA.*

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## **AUTHORISATION**

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## PART 1 – INTRODUCTION

1. This Guide provides Civil Responders with guidance for the Defence contribution to resilience in the UK and is designed to act as a ready guide. It is an addendum to the Joint Defence Publication 02 (Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience) and contains the key elements for Civil Responders from this publication. Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 04) neither the Armed Forces nor the wider Ministry of Defence are designated Category 1 or 2 Responders. Therefore military support is provided on an assistance basis and is known as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). There are no standing forces for MACA tasks thus support cannot be guaranteed and, where it is provided, is likely to incur a charge. However, a role exists for the military to augment others' responses to major incidents when the capability or capacity of civil responders has been overwhelmed.
2. This Guide is consistent with Central and Cross-Government strategy<sup>1</sup> and as Government policy evolves, the Guide will remain relevant through a biennial review.

### Scope

3. For reasons of classification, this Guide focuses on MACA support to resilience rather than the UK Defence contribution to the Government's Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST). The Guide details the principles under which military support may be provided. This is set in the context of the role of the Armed Forces in the UK, including the constitutional and legal constraints. It explains the categorisation of military capability into niche and augmentation and details a non-exhaustive range of common planning assumptions for Civil Responders' consideration prior to requesting military aid. The pivotal role of the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO), supported by the Royal Naval Regional Liaison Officers (RNRLOs) and Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officers (RAFRLOs), in MACA is a common thread throughout. Finally, it includes an explanation of the practical steps required to apply for such aid, sources of advice and the charges likely to be incurred.

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<sup>1</sup> The National Security Strategy, the National Resilience Planning Assumptions, CCA04, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat work on the National Capability Programme and Acts and Reports from the Devolved Administrations.

## PART 2 – MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE UK

### Role of the Armed Forces in the UK

4. The framework for consequence management of civil contingencies in the UK is one of civil primacy, capability and capacity. CCA 04 places statutory responsibilities on the civil authorities (Category 1 and 2 Responders) in civil crises. Although no responsibility was placed on Defence under this Act, Defence recognises its position as part of the wider Government team through the provision of appropriate support when required. As a result of CCA04, the civil response capability has developed significantly over the past few years such that it now manages emergencies that previously required Defence assistance. Therefore, it is no longer necessary or reasonable to base current planning assumptions on operations involving military aid as it was prior to the introduction of CCA 04.

5. During an emergency, unforeseen impacts on the resilience plan or events in excess of planning assumptions might necessitate requests for Military Aid. Defence will balance requests for assistance to the civil authorities against core military tasks.

### The Constitutional and Legal Basis for UK Operations

6. Defence is exercised under Prerogative power. Letters Patent from Her Majesty carry delegation of some of the responsibilities for defence of the realm to the Defence Council. The Armed Forces are therefore under the direct command of Central Government and Armed Forces personnel do not have additional powers granted to them. They must operate within UK and international law at all times. Under certain specific situations,<sup>2</sup> they can be granted additional powers under Part 2 of CCA04 and the 1964 Emergency Powers Act. For constitutional reasons, any members of the Armed Forces deployed on operations must remain under military command at all times and are only ordered to undertake activity by Defence Ministers and the Defence Council. This represents a key tenet of democracy, whereby the Armed Forces remain under the control of Central Government – the representatives of the population. This also means that provision of Military Aid automatically involves the elevation of the response to Central Government and Defence Minister authorisation.

### Ministry of Defence Contribution to Resilience

7. **Niche Capabilities.** Defence maintains and provides specific guaranteed small-scale niche capabilities for UK operations.<sup>3</sup> These are mostly for counter-terrorism with only limited relevance to emergencies not related to counter-terrorism.

<sup>2</sup> Such as military assistance to assist Civil Powers in maintaining public order post a catastrophic event.

<sup>3</sup> An Explosive Ordnance Disposal capability including a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear elements, an air surveillance, policing and defence system, a land, air and maritime counter terrorism capability and a maritime Search and Rescue capability.

8. **Augmentation.** Augmentation capability is MACA when the capacity of the civil authorities is insufficient, or when Defence capabilities are unique. These exceed niche capabilities, are not designed or funded for UK operations and, therefore, cannot be guaranteed. Thus, the provision of augmentation is likely to be at the expense of other, core, MOD business. Resilience planners are advised not to make assumptions about the criteria for a Defence Minister's decision in advance nor make assumptions about the level of military deployment which will depend on Armed Forces' commitment to operations. The JRLO, supported by the RNLO and RAFLO, is an essential source of advice for augmentation.

### **Civil/Military Liaison**

9. As part of its UK command and control structure MOD has 11 Regional Army Brigade Headquarters across the UK with geographical areas of responsibility that match closely those of the Government Offices of the Regions and Devolved Administrations. Each Brigade area has at least one JRLO. At the Central Government level, the UK Counter Terrorism and Resilience Team (UK CT&R) within MOD provides the focus for assistance to the civil authorities. They are supported in this role by the Standing Joint Commander (UK) who generates and provides augmentation manpower and capabilities and the command and control link between the Regional Brigades and MOD.

10. The JRLO provides advice and should be engaged early in the planning for any response to civil emergencies as the initial military point of contact.<sup>4</sup> Where distance or spread of interests prevents the JRLO from frequent contact with the civil authorities, he is supported by Military Liaison Officers (MLOs), usually the Commanding Officers of military establishments or units within that region. RNLOs and RAFLOs supplement the capability of the JRLO<sup>5</sup> and provide specialist single-Service advice. The Armed Forces are also represented by the Regional Brigade Commander or JRLO at Government Office of the Region (GOR), Regional Resilience Fora (RRF) and Local Resilience Fora (LRF) and the equivalents in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

### **Planning Assumptions for Defence Contributions**

11. As part of the national response, Defence's assumptions about UK resilience start with the nationally agreed cross-Government planning process (National Resilience Planning Assumptions). Indeed Defence, as an owner of national capabilities, can expect to be part of a cross-Government response through the provision of a range of capabilities in the event of major national or regional disruptive challenge. Such a response is likely to call upon assets nationally rather than those local to the

<sup>4</sup> In Scotland the initial point of contact is the Military Liaison Officer.

<sup>5</sup> The JRLO is *primes inter pares* amongst the single service Liaison Officers and MLOs.

emergency which may not be the most appropriate. A non-exhaustive list of Defence capabilities and roles which may be of use to the Civil Responder even though they are not dedicated to UK Operations is shown below.

### **General Support**

12. **General Duties.** Defence is able to call upon relatively large numbers of disciplined personnel at short notice although specialist equipment is often limited due to its use on operations. Service personnel require the same health and safety conditions applicable to the emergency services.

13. **Preservation of Life/Emergency Assistance.** Under specific circumstances, local base commanders have the authority to provide emergency assistance to the civil community if life is at risk, to alleviate distress or, exceptionally, to protect property. Historically, this type of support has been provided regularly during environmental incidents. For legal and financial reasons, it is vital that all parties determine the point at which life is no longer immediately threatened and more general support is required. Armed Forces support may not always be available and speed of response may vary, therefore military assistance should not be assumed as a core element in planning for the immediate consequences of environmental incidents.

14. **Armed Policing.** The Ministry of Defence Police possess, *inter alia*, specialist firearms and maritime policing expertise for protecting military bases/assets in the UK. Augmentation could be provided to another police force with MOD sanction under mutual aid principles via the Police National Information and Coordination Centre (PNICC).

15. **Consequences of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Event.** The Armed Forces are able to decontaminate small numbers of contaminated casualties or fatalities and have technical and scientific advisors on general decontamination. The Armed Forces' decontamination capability is small in scale, often deployed, and is designed to allow battlefield vehicles and Armed Forces personnel to continue to operate effectively rather than providing a full decontamination capability.

### **Medical Support**

16. **Dealing with impacts on the National Health Service (NHS).** The Armed Forces draw heavily on the NHS for their own medical needs both during and between military operations. Provision of Armed Forces medical support in the UK would therefore draw on and denude the NHS.

17. **Dealing with Fatalities.** Although all members of the Armed Forces are trained in the sensitive treatment of fatalities, they are not trained in dealing with mass fatalities and most personnel are not forensically aware. Defence uses commercial

mortuaries as military facilities and buildings are unsuitable for use as temporary mortuaries. If they are not being used for military operations, hard standing areas in military establishments may be available for mobile temporary mortuary facilities but with limitations on access. Therefore, any support would be non-specialist in nature. It is inadvisable to nominate military sites in local resilience plans as locations for emergency mortuaries.

## **Logistics Support**

18. **Logistic Advice.** A small number of Armed Forces personnel are available to advise the Civil Contingencies Committee in Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) during wide-area civil emergencies. In addition Defence could deploy logistics specialists to other levels of command but these are not held at readiness for such tasks.

19. **Transport.** Each UK region contains a small number of military coaches and trucks. Defence uses commercial contractors to transport its own people and supplies in the UK and many locations outside of the UK by land, sea and air. The Armed Forces have limited integral air transport, maritime capacity and land transport for support to overseas operations. However, Defence may have a small number of helicopters and portable boats available in the UK which may have utility in moving limited amounts of stores or small numbers or personnel.

20. **Engineering.** The total stock of engineering equipment held by the Armed Forces in the UK is similar to that normally available in a medium-sized town. Defence stocks are held centrally. There may be some relevant engineering expertise within Defence depending on the situation such as power generation, bridging or temporary flood protection.

21. **Estate.** Defence has a relatively large and widely spread footprint across the UK. Day-to-day, military bases are busy supporting operational activity and subject to operational security. They may be available for operational responses to operations conducted by the Civil Powers or non-operational support such as accommodation or training facilities.

22. **Provision of fuel.** Defence holds sufficient reserves to support military activities and a small number of fuel tankers in the UK. Defence does not have a role in the National Emergency Plan – Fuel.

23. **Failure of Telecommunications.** Defence has its own resilient communications for use by the Armed Forces to enable their deployment to civilian command and control nodes if required. It is not a national resilient telecommunications infrastructure. Defence may have some small scale capacity to augment civil capability with specialist engineers and communications staff if required.

## PART 3 – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

24. **Key Principles.** The provision of military aid is guided by 3 key principles which apply to each request, usually at the early stages during the initial liaison between the Civil Responder and the JRLO and then again at MOD level:

- a. Military aid should only be provided where the need for someone to act is clear and where other options have been discounted by the Civil Responder. The use of mutual aid, other agencies, and the private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.
- b. The Civil Authority making the request lacks the required level of capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.
- c. The Civil Authority has a capability but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources.

25. Since MACA should only be employed where there is a genuine need for aid by the Civil Responder, it is worth noting that MACA does not apply to Defence tasks undertaken for presentational purposes or Defence in society reasons. Early discussion with the JRLO will ensure the two areas are not confused.

26. **MACA Categories.** Requests are made to MOD by Central Government Departments in order to provide military capability in a number of categories. They are distinct from one another legally and politically, as well as in terms of military implications. However, these categories are for internal Defence planning purposes and whilst some Civil Responders may be aware of them, they have no bearing on a MACA request and should not be used. As ever, the JRLO will advise how best to achieve the desired effect.

### How to Request Military Aid

27. **Request Procedure.** It is strongly advised to generate the request in conjunction with the JRLO and, where necessary, the RNLO/RAFLO for an initial indication of the likelihood of success. Wherever possible, the request should be submitted as early as possible, especially for pre-planned events. There are times when last minute requests are unavoidable but this should be due to dynamic events rather than poor planning. A generic request format is included at Annex A although the contents will vary depending on the nature of the request. Any request must indicate clearly:

- a. **Assistance Required.** If possible this should describe the **effect** the Civil Responder wishes to achieve rather than the military assets they think Defence should provide. For example, a request to ‘move 2 tonnes of sandbags from location **A** to location **B** by a set time’ rather than ‘2 helicopters to move

sandbags as soon as possible' gives Defence greater scope for selecting the most appropriate assets, increasing the likelihood of success.


b. **General Background.** A brief description of the situation necessitating the request and, in particular, whether it is part of a criminal investigation. This will help determine appropriateness.

c. **Evidence of the Capability Gap.** Confirmation that reasonable efforts have been made to address the requirement from other civilian or commercial sources or via mutual aid.

d. **Timings.** When the aid is required and for how long?

28. **Request Routing.** Once complete, the request will be made to MOD by the Government Department responsible for the requesting organisation. The JRLO will also inform MOD of its impending arrival. On receipt of the request, MOD asks itself two basic questions, can we? (does Defence have the necessary assets available?) and should we? (is this request legal and compliant with MOD policy and an appropriate task for Defence to be involved in?). If the answer to both questions is yes, then the requesting Government Department is informed and presented with an estimate of the charges likely to be incurred. If the requesting Government Department is content with the charges, the MOD will seek the necessary ministerial authorisation. Once obtained the Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (the military link between JRLOs and MOD) will generate the military effect. Of note, in a large-scale emergency military capability may be part of a national response and subject to multiple requests. Should response need to be prioritised, this will be done by the Civil Contingencies Committee at COBR, on which Defence has a seat.

## The MACA Request Process



29. **Requesting Emergency Assistance.** The process above does not rigidly apply when requesting emergency assistance (where life is at risk, in order to alleviate distress and, exceptionally, to protect property). Such a request should be passed directly to the local military unit and/or the JRLO. It should provide details of the assistance required, expressed in terms of capability or effect, but not specific military units or equipment. The most appropriate Defence response will be determined by the local military unit or the military chain of command if time permits. It is likely that a situation warranting emergency assistance would last only a few hours. Any additional assistance would be subject to a MACA request following the process described above.

## Charging Regime

30. **General.** MACA activity is, with the exception of niche capabilities, not funded within the Defence budget and is therefore conducted on a repayment basis. Treasury rules dictate that Government Departments charge for services that do not form part of their funded tasks.

31. **MOD Policy.** There are 4 financial principles governing MOD policy:

- a. **Defence will charge full costs except where there is imminent danger to life (emergency assistance) when charges are waived.** Charging full costs avoids subsidising non-defence tasks. It also acts as a useful mechanism to constrain Defence assistance to the minimum necessary.

- b. Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes. Where work is done by the Armed Forces for other purposes, the MOD is required by Treasury rules to secure reimbursement for the costs incurred.
- c. Service personnel must not be used as cheap labour or in competition with commercial firms.
- d. Defence assistance must be safeguarded against risks through appropriate insurance and indemnity arrangements.

32. **Full Costs.** These cover all costs (both direct and indirect) incurred in providing the assistance and will include basic pay and allowances of the personnel involved. Under Treasury rules, it is normal for Government Departments to recover full costs as a default.

### **Media**

33. MACA will attract media attention and should be considered in a Civil Responder's media strategy. MOD, in its supporting role, will determine the Defence media stance but will take a lead from the Lead Government Department so a coordinated message is generated. However MOD will also have its own message at national level which the Lead Government Department will be made aware of.

## **PART 4 – CONCLUSION**


34. MOD is a contributor to the wider Government responsibility for the safety and security of the citizens of the UK. The level of that contribution is governed by the requirement and, crucially, on Defence's ability to undertake operations in support of HMG's objectives. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities can, however, make a significant contribution at times of crisis and the Armed Forces remain prepared to respond to a range of emergencies in the UK within the MACA construct.

## ANNEX A – GENERIC MACA REQUEST

Date:	Time:
Location:	
<p>Summary of incident:</p> <p><i>A brief summary of the request including the background and nature of the incident/event, where it is taking place and timings.</i></p> <p><i>For Criminal Investigations – A brief outline of the investigation and why military aid is being sought. This should provide enough background information to put the request into an appropriate context without detailing the Police case.</i></p> <p><i>For Major Events – For large events or events where more than one military capability is likely to be required, you should seek the appointment of a military liaison officer as early as possible during the planning process. The appointment of a liaison officer does not, however, eliminate the need to submit a detailed request once an appropriate package of support has been identified.</i></p> <p><i>If appropriate, a detailed and up to date threat assessment to justify the deployment of military resources should be included. This should be event-specific, and not based on the general threat state. For annual or recurring events, the threat assessment should not merely be a re-use of previous assessments.</i></p>	
<p>What other options have been considered. For example, mutual aid or private/commercial options?</p> <p><i>You should confirm that the ability to achieve the desired effect is not available either from within own resources, or from other sources i.e. commercial providers and/or mutual aid. This should include consideration of whether the capability can be obtained from another Government Department or Agency.</i></p>	
<p>What are you trying to achieve?</p> <p><i>You should list you objectives here</i></p>	
<p>What is the effect required?</p> <p><i>Include a clear statement of what you are trying to achieve. You should not aim to identify a particular military unit that can achieve this outcome. The MOD will always determine the best means of delivering the desired effect.</i></p>	

<p>Is there a requirement for armed military assistance?</p>								
<p>Timing: When do you want the effect delivered by?</p> <p><i>Details are needed about when the assistance is required and for how long. Military assets are not always available so more notice means greater flexibility. Conversely, there may be an opportunity to utilise an asset already in the area or en route so the more notice the better.</i></p> <p><i>Routine Operations - planned operations should be submitted at least 14 days, preferably 28 days, in advance of the requirement.</i></p> <p><i>Special Operations - For incidents where there is an imminent danger to life, the staffing process can be completed in a much reduced timeframe.</i></p>								
<p>MACA assistance requested:</p> <p>Date <span style="margin-left: 200px;">Time:</span></p> <p><i>For the Police only, this should include confirmation that the request is authorised by a named ACPO officer,</i></p>								
<p>MACA request agreed by:</p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%;">LGD</td> <td style="width: 20%;">Date:</td> <td style="width: 20%;">Time:</td> <td style="width: 40%;">Signature:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOD</td> <td>Date:</td> <td>Time:</td> <td>Signature:</td> </tr> </table>	LGD	Date:	Time:	Signature:	MOD	Date:	Time:	Signature:
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# ANNEX B – REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS LOCATIONS



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## ANNEX C – CONTACT NUMBERS FOR REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS

### JRLOs

Area	Name	Location	Civ No	Mobile
51 (Scottish) Bde	Lt Col John Kelly	Stirling	0131 3104870	07881 986775
15 (North East) Bde S	Lt Col Graham Whitmore	York	01904 662184	07909 952375
15 (North East) Bde N	Lt Col Chris Green	York	01904 662289	07920 785934
38 (Irish) Bde	Lt Col Huw Morgan	Lisburn	0289 2263503	07824 607770
42 (North West) Bde	Lt Col Ray Carolin	Preston	01722 260413	07739 918945
143 (West Midlands) Bde	Lt Col Guy Chambers	Shrewsbury	01743 262667	07967 111807
160 (Wales) Bde	Lt Col David Lowles	Brecon	01874 613381	07970 628545
49 (Easr) Bde E	Lt Col Richard Dixon-Warren	Chilwell	0115 9572918	07748 148174
49 (Easr) Bde EM	Lt Col Andy McCombe	Chilwell	0115 9572919	07747 008561
43 (South West) Bde	Lt Col Richard Aubrey-Fletcher	Tidworth	01980 656413	07825 118634
145 (South) Bde	Lt Col Alan Miller	Aldershot	01252 347858	07771 835075
2 (South East) Bde	Lt Col Richard Clements	Shorncliffe	01303 225530	07775 587356
London District	Vacant	London	0207 4142433	
London District	Lt Col Sarah Streete	London	0207 4142252	07760 300188

**RAFRLOs**

<b>Area</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Civ No</b>	<b>Mobile</b>
Scotland	Wg Cdr Bob Lander	Leuchars	01334 839471 ext 7462	07833 912924
North	Wg Cdr Hugh Stewart	Linton-on-Ouse	01347 847407	07801 900780
East	Wg Cdr John McCarthy	Cottesmore	01572 812241	07979 537682
East Midlands	Wg Cdr Tim Owen	Marham	01760 446112	07767 663359
London/South-East	Wg Cdr Nick Fox	Odiham	01256 367363	07770 721494
South-West	Wg Cdr Rob Tripp	Lyneham	01249 896689	07796 568380
Wales	Wg Cdr Philip Greville	Valley, or St Athan	01407 766709	07802 348513
West Midlands	Wg Cdr Nick Nicholson	Shawbury	01939 257257	07771 730553
Northern ireland	Sqn Ldr Andy Malbon	Aldergrove	02894 456597	-

**RNRLOs**

Scotland	Vacant	Faslane	01436 674333	-
North	Lt Cdr Charles Wood	HMS CALLIOPE	0191 4778607	-
Wales and West of England	Lt Cdr Jonathan Lee	HMS FLYING FOX	0117 9786016	07930 473741
East of England	Cdr Paul Hill	HMS PRESIDENT	020 74817355	07860 828702