

CONCLUSIONS

25. The attack was assisted by a number of contributing factors, viz:
- a. The Bandsmen's routine clearly identified the coffee-boat as an obvious target.
 - b. Proximity of overlooking civilian properties facilitated easy reconnaissance and planning.
 - c. Lack of a security perimeter and poor in-depth security measures aided easy access and intrusion.
 - d. Lack of a visible military presence from 0100 hours onwards.
 - e. Failure to carry out first entry searches of insecure buildings.
 - f. Proximity of the target to the barracks' perimeter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

26. The perimeter of all 3 barracks should be enhanced to provide an effective physical barrier to the ill-disposed.
27. RM patrols should be redesigned to ensure effective 24 hour presence throughout all 3 barracks.
28. Perimeter lighting and building security measures should be reviewed.
29. Serious thought should be given to prevention of routine musters of Service personnel in view of the public.
30. Personnel should be briefed and trained in procedures of first entry checks into insecure buildings.
31. Extra security attention should be paid to identifiable targets that are close to the barracks' perimeters.
32. The modus operandi displayed in this attack should be widely circulated to assist counter-terrorist planning in other establishments.

Captain Royal Marines
for Flag Officer Portsmouth

COMMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS

1. The following information is supplied in addition to the main report and reflects information and opinions relevant to the Area Security Officer's investigations only.

GUARD FORCE

2. Reliance Security Services Ltd (RSSL)

- a. Personnel employed by RSSL are not trained in any kind of search techniques.
- b. At Bikini States BLACK ALFA and AMBER random ineffective searches of vehicles are made, but hand baggage is never searched.
- c. RSSL continually fall below the accepted manning levels.
- d. The turnover of RSSL staff is so high as to make vetting almost impossible, and provides men who are not familiar with ground or routines.
- e. Wages paid by RSSL are so low as to make the quality/calibre of the employee suspect. There are instances of certain members of RSSL who do not patrol South Drill Field when it is raining, and others who are too nervous to patrol Dobbins Field and the cemetery.
- f. When RSSL are understaffed, they do not inform RM School of Music.
- g. Whilst RSSL's orders for their own staff seem to be quite good, there appears to be no input from the Unit.
- h. RSSL's orders do not differentiate in procedures for dealing with armed and unarmed intruders.
- j. Clock-tapes and occurrence sheets are not passed to the Unit for checking before dispatch to RSSL headquarters at Chatham as required by the contract. Incident reports are, however, passed directly to the Provost Sergeant.
- k. RSSL have a reasonable and working radio communication system, and a radio, telephone and distress alarm link with the ARF.
- l. The Provost Sergeant has a good working relationship with the RSSL Supervisors and briefs them on a daily basis. He provides a weekly forecast of events for RSSL.
- m. Despite the comments about quality and manning levels, RSSL were sometimes diligent in their patrol routines and regularly reported insecure buildings, intruders and suspicious vehicles.

3. RM Guard Force

- a. Including an authorised overbearing by DCGRM Apr 89, the all up complemented RM security staff was 22 personnel. At the time of the incident the total was 3 short leaving a number of 19. None of these 19 were mis-employed. It should be noted that this figure of 19 was only achieved when 5 extra men joined as late as 4 Sep 89.
- b. Security staff were employed in accordance with Annex B to TRSF 7/14/32 dated 1 Mar 89, except that:
 - (1) The duty driver for the Unit was one of the ARF and consequently frequently away. Sometimes part or all of the ARF accompanied the duty driver!
 - (2) There is no ARF during block leave periods. The only military presence during leave is the 3 duty SNCOs.
 - (3) Sometimes the ARF were absent i.e when large numbers of other Units were accommodated at Deal, the ARF (unarmed) were deployed in the town as Shore Patrol. This was not at the request of the Kent Police.
- c. CO Deal was not happy with the general standard of the men drafted for security duties. They tend to be either ranks due for discharge, or Corps or Navy sportsmen.
- d. There was no formal reading of orders or briefing by the Duty Officer or Duty JNCO as required by the Interim Orders for the ARF. Copies of their orders were displayed in the guardroom and in the ARF room.
- e. The ARF interim orders gave no formal instructions about the times or duration of wandering patrols.
- f. The ARF were never exercised in their reaction drills in accordance with their orders.
- g. In the event of the duty driver being away, 2 men being on patrol, it left a single JNCO/Mne as reserve/reaction.

4. Perimeter and Lighting

- a. The Unit had requested improvements to the perimeter in Jun 89 but works had not commenced by the time of the incident. It is thought likely that there may have been reluctance to spend money on these enhancements due to the uncertainty of the future of the Barracks.
- b. The perimeter walls and fences delineated boundaries and could in no way be considered a proper security fence or barrier.
- c. Lighting of the whole of the perimeter is poor or non-existent.
- d. A survey has already been carried out of the whole perimeter and work is in progress.

5. Building Security

- a. The security arrangements for buildings in general are poor. Many buildings including Officers' Mess, SNCOs' Accommodation and other ranks accommodation either cannot be, or are not locked. For this reason and the lack of sentries/access control on buildings, the Unit never achieves proper Bikini State AMBER.
- b. First entry checks are never carried out on insecure buildings.
- c. Despite buildings being found insecure, and action taken by the Provost Sergeant to bring it to the attention of the occupants, scant regard is taken and repetitions occur.

6. South Barracks Gate

- a. The South Barracks Gate is the main entry point for Officers' Mess, SNCOs' Mess, Sick Bay/WRNS quarters and Headquarters, it is not manned between 2359 and 0600 hours. Officially entry between these times is gained by contacting the guard force. However it is known that an unknown number of wicket gate keys exists.

7. Security Exercise and Drills

- a. Lip service has been played to security exercises and drills. Buildings have been evacuated, but cordons, incident control points and operations rooms procedures have never been considered.
- b. Disaster plans and exercises involving local emergency services have never been tested.
- c. The USO was unaware of the requirement to conduct a biennial security exercise.

8. Focal Point System

- a. The only substantiated notifications on the focal point system by the Unit were Deal Police and HQ TRSFRM.
- b. Shorncliffe Garrison and Flag Officer Portsmouth were informed by the local Police and SE Dist respectively.

9. Security Awareness. Security awareness in the Unit was poor. The following points are random indicators of the general attitude within the Unit.

- a. USO who had been in post since 4 Jul 89 had not attended a USO Course or attempted to book one. Consequently his knowledge of the subject was lacking.
- b. USO had no knowledge of the bi-ennial security report issued in Apr 89 until shown a copy by ASyO staff after the bombing. Because of this the follow-up actions required by the report were not actioned as required by HQ TRSF's letter 6/9/415 dated 19 Apr 89.

- c. Orders for the ARF were Interim Orders only, signed by the previous Adjt dated 6 Sep 88.
 - d. Security Orders in use, promulgated pre 1986, were inadequate. The re-write, which was taking place during the inspection of Mar 89 had still not been proof-read, amended and promulgated.
 - e. Buildings that were designed to be secured were deliberately left open for convenience by snibbing locks and removing glass from Redlam bolts (SNCO Mess, Officers Mess and Staff Band Complex).
 - f. The Band consistently refused to contribute to any part of the guarding requirement in the Unit, even at heightened alert states. This state of affairs applied after the bombing.
 - g. Neither the Unit nor the Band had any idea of the requirement, never mind the content of a security plan for Service events open to the public, or public events on Service property in accordance with Chapter 46 of BR 4005.
 - h. Having gone to Bikini State RED after the incident the Unit reverted to State BLACK ALFA, having failed to read the signal ordering AMBER nationwide. When the nation went to BLACK ALFA the Unit stayed at AMBER for the same reason.
10. Considering the number and profile of RM Band engagements, serious consideration should be given to adding to the Band complement a security trained SNCO (non-Band Service) to carry out the function of Band Security Officer/SNCO.
 11. The Unit did not have an adequate Operations Room to cope with emergencies. In the event the Adjutant's Office was used which disrupted the day to day running of the Unit and hampered the running of the post bomb operations. A Disaster/Emergency Headquarters (DEHQ) should be identified and equipped with communications. (Portsmouth Orders for the Defence of Establishments Paragraph 0302). An alternative DEHQ should be identified.