Logistics Ops fuel the fight against the Taliban

We took command in the same week that 19 Light Brigade launched Operation PANTHER'S CLAW - arguably the most sustained, violent and bloody period of combat that British Forces have been committed to since the Falklands War.

For 30 days the battle groups in southern Helmand took the fight into Taliban positions throughout the Babaji area, while simultaneous operations held ground in the Sangin Valley and around Musa-Qala in the north.

Giving the troops the support they needed was gruelling, particularly for our recovery teams, the medics in the frontline and those dealing with the wretched aftermath in the hospital.

Supporting PANTHER'S CLAW and the elections that followed was our number one priority, but there was plenty more for us to do. A major challenge was clearing damaged and obsolete vehicles and surplus stock out of theatre.

In the six months to December around 370 vehicles and more than 7,000 tonnes of stock will have been returned to the UK.

The Joint Force Logistics Component HQ had been earmarked to do our tour but was deployed at short notice to manage the drawdown from Iraq. So, we were asked to step up to the plate, filling the joint force support role in Afghanistan.

We soon discovered this job was far broader than simply delivering people and stuff to the right place at the right time in the most cost effective manner.

Commanding more than 3,000 military, civilians, contractors and local nationals in Camp Bastion and smaller support units in Kabul and Kandahar, brought with it a host of tactical force protection and ground defence responsibilities.

We also had responsibility for the treacherous 1,100km route from Karachi to the forward operating bases in Helmand, principally supporting the 5,000 men and women of Task Force Helmand.

And, our support stretched beyond Helmand province, to British interests in and around Kabul and Kandahar, including 904 Expeditionary Air Wing and Joint Aviation Group.

Responsibility for 10,300 military and civilian personnel, 1,550 vehicles and more than 16,000 weapon systems, meant having to hold 700,000 individual rations, 3 million litres of water, 4 million litres of fuel and 3,000 tonnes of ammunition.

The Close Support Logistics Regiment generated around 350 tonnes of combat logistic patrol lift every ten days or so - about half the full requirement.

To fill the gap we had air despatch, civilian contract haulage and various helicopter options, but none of these proved wholly reliable.

For example, the shooting down of a civilian Mi-26 helicopter over Sangin in July effectively meant that half the forward operating bases (FOBs) could not use civilian contract helicopter missions.

Our attempt to fight a civilian convoy into the same area - which took two months of contract negotiations - was only partly successful.

Three of its 24 loads of construction stores were lost to IED strikes on the outward journey and an ambush on the return leg left 10 drivers dead and up to 20 vehicles destroyed. We put further such moves on hold until we could guarantee better security and more control.

Despite setbacks there have been successes using contractors. We were able to resupply several southern Helmand bases with independently run local (Jingly) convoys and, towards the end of our tour, more locations were being opened up for contract helicopter missions.

Reliance on contractors in a hostile environment is fraught with difficulties. Despite the successes, and the dogged resilience of many who suffered significant casualties on our behalf, civilian delivery cannot be guaranteed.

Contractorised solutions work well in relatively benign areas but costing at least $10,000 for each truckload, they are very expensive
to run.

There are still a great many places in Afghanistan where we must use military combat logistic patrols, supported by combat arms activity, to fight stores and materiel through to the FOBs.

combat logistic patrols These patrols are deliberate manoeuvre operations and require the same degree of integrated planning, force protection, surveillance and air support that any other battle group mission receives.

It is worth highlighting the role of the vehicle mechanics and recovery teams on these missions.

Every IED strike, vehicle bog-in or breakdown requires them to dismount, conduct an inch-by-inch search to the stricken vehicle before conducting the repair, denial or recovery task - often under enemy fire.

Contrary to what the media would have us believe, we have seen an unprecedented inflow of new and specialised equipment to theatre - more than £200m's worth.

The media have done much to fuel the public perception that our equipment is not fit for purpose and has largely ignored the arrival of Mastiff, Jackal, Ridgback and the excellent new fleet of cargo and recovery vehicles.

The equipment capability programme also fielded several more discrete persistent surveillance capabilities and weapon systems which were deliberately not exposed to the public scrutiny.

The impact on the morale component of our troops who know that they are now travelling in vehicles able to withstand significant blast is significant.

If managing theatre logistics, equipment and infrastructure caused us the biggest headaches, it was support to the troops that caused the most heartache.

To date, the small team have initiated more than 500 notifications of casualty and dealt with nearly 180 compassionate returns.

More than 60 British personnel have died so far during our tour. Nearly 500 have been wounded, many with life changing injuries.

Our hospital surgical teams have conducted more than 1,000 operations requiring nearly 1,800 hours of surgery.

More than 500 Afghan nationals, including many seriously injured children, received critical care treatment during the same period. The medical teams - British, Danish and American - behaved with superb professionalism and saved countless lives and limbs.

The casualty figures are, on average, double those for the same period in 2008. Some were an inevitable consequence of our taking the fight to the Taliban.

Most, however, were caused by the insurgents' use of IEDs, which killed and maimed our soldiers and Afghan civilians with indiscriminate savagery.

Commanding a joint HQ and command has been an immense privilege; as ever I was struck by the quality of the men and women across the Services and the Civil Service who were very much part of the team.

This article is taken from the December 2009 edition of Defence Focus - the magazine for everyone in Defence.