CDS: We must seize the opportunities our military have created in Afghanistan

Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup's comments have been published in the Guardian newspaper today, Friday 28 August 2009. The full article by Sir Jock appears below.

In it he said that the rationale for British engagement in Afghanistan is the straightforward need to counter extremist Islamist groups that pose a direct threat to the UK.

Although we can't take them on one-by-one he said that we need to foster an environment in which it is harder for them to thrive and part of that effort is the reduction of the ungoverned spaces that harbour such groups.

Sir Jock said that where we are providing the requisite degree of security, real governance is starting to emerge, evidence he said that the strategy, when properly resourced, is working.

More boots on the ground are needed he said but that they need to be Afghan boots.

He also said that equipment is good and improving but as the enemy adapt their tactics to counter British capabilities, what is the right equipment, changes.

Sir Jock said he believed what we are doing in Afghanistan is of strategic importance to the UK and that the strategy there is the right one, but he sees two major threats to success:

• National and international will to see through such a long term endeavour.
• Afghan delivery - following the recent Afghan elections, Sir Jock said that early Afghan progress on things like security sector reform, rule of law and economic development are essential.

Sir Jock finished his article saying that our military are withstanding hardship, danger and loss with remarkable determination. They look to us to seize the opportunities they've created; to deliver on the issues of will, commitment and Afghan political progress that are now crucial to success. We owe them and their families no less.

Here follows the full article by Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:

"All of us in the military knew, and made clear, that this would be a long, hard summer for our people in Afghanistan; that they faced a resilient and determined enemy who would make every effort to disrupt our work to support the development of effective governance in Helmand province.

"Such a forecast required no particular prescience on our part. It was clear to us that the Taliban leadership had - rightly - identified Helmand and Kandahar as their vital ground, and that they would, as a consequence, throw everything they had into the struggle there. That's why ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] responded by increasing its own force levels in the region, through the deployment of elements of the United States Marine Corps.

"Nor do we gain any satisfaction from the accuracy of our prediction. Because the consequence is a price that our people have paid in blood. During 19 Brigade's tour so far they have lost 55 soldiers on operations, and many others have been wounded, some very seriously.

"Each death is a tragedy that has left bereaved and grieving families and friends; some of the injuries have changed people's lives for ever. As a military, we know that our job involves risk, and that in conflict we will suffer losses. It is not something one ever gets used to, but it is something one learns to deal with. At the same time, though, we have constantly to ask ourselves whether we are gaining sufficient strategic benefit to justify the price our people are paying. This is not, and never can be, a simple calculus. How do you weigh a human life in the balance against an intangible? But it is a judgement we have to make.

"Some will always be opposed to military action; I understand and respect that, although not unnaturally I take a very different view. Most, though, will accept the logic of military involvement on the international scene, provided it can be justified. And in the context of Afghanistan, it seems to me that we have to be able to answer three basic questions.

"First: is it worth it? Is the situation in Afghanistan of sufficient importance to the UK's strategic interests to justify the commitment and the cost? Secondly: is it doable? Even if the issue is of strategic importance, is what we are seeking to achieve actually within the realm of the possible? And finally: are we doing it properly? If we are able to convince on the first two questions, we still need to demonstrate that we can make and are making the mental and physical commitment necessary for success.

"There has been much debate about the rationale for our engagement in Afghanistan. I see it in fairly straightforward terms. We face extremist Islamist groups who pursue a campaign of global terrorist violence in order to further their ideological ends. These groups pose a direct threat to the UK, its citizens and their interests, so must be countered.

"But we cannot counter them effectively by taking them on one-by-one. We have to help foster an environment in which it is much harder for them to thrive and operate. And as part of that effort, we need to reduce the ungoverned spaces which harbour such groups, and from which they mount their campaigns.

"One such area - of critical importance to us - straddles the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our objective there is to help the governments of both those countries extend effective governance to parts of their population that have been without it for far too long, in order to reduce the effectiveness of Islamist terrorist groups that pose a direct threat to the UK. So Afghanistan is an issue of strategic importance for us, of immediate relevance to our own security.

"Governance, of course, is a political activity. That's why we have always maintained that strategic success in Afghanistan can only be delivered through a political process. Some would say that our military involvement makes such a process harder rather than easier - that our presence is making things worse rather than better. The supposed evidence for this is that security in the south of the country is worse now than when we first deployed to Helmand over three years ago.

"But three years ago the Taliban campaign was at a relatively early stage, so we faced what was inevitably going to be a rising tide of violence. And of course confronting the Taliban - challenging them for control of Helmand - was always going to lead to conflict. The alternative was to allow the Taliban to regain control.

"There would now certainly be less violence, but the strategic outcome would not have been in our interests, nor - importantly - what the people of Afghanistan wanted. So our military purpose has been to create the time and space within which political solutions, local as much as national, can be forged. The evidence in fact is that where we are providing the requisite degree of security, real governance is starting to emerge at the provincial and district levels; that the strategy, when properly resourced, is working.

"But that raises two further questions: what is the requisite degree of security, and how can it be provided? There is an inevitable element of chicken and egg here. Real, lasting security will only result from political solutions; but those solutions can only be reached within some kind of security envelope. So we have to understand that the security we are providing is not an end in itself, but a bridge to strategic success. It will therefore be imperfect, but that doesn't matter. What matters is whether it's good enough. We do not need to eliminate violence completely, desirable though that would be; we need to restrict and contain it sufficiently to allow political progress to be made.

"If we're to succeed in that task, we have to follow two key precepts. The first is to concentrate on the population, not the territory. In Helmand, for example, the bulk of the people are in the centre of the province, around the area of what one might call Greater Lashkar Gah. So it's there that we have to focus our efforts and our resources. There will be thinly settled regions where we will not be able to provide the same degree of security, but we can cover about 80% of the population. If we succeed with them, the rest will follow in due course. We are always conscious that this is not a battle against the Taliban; it's a battle for the Afghan people.

"The second precept is to get the Afghans delivering their own security as soon as possible. ISAF's role in leading military operations is strictly time limited. No people, especially ones as proud as Afghans, are going to want foreigners delivering their security for longer than is absolutely necessary. And in any event, even the best trained foreigners are never going to understand local and tribal dynamics the way an Afghan will.

"So the development of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are key objectives for ISAF. The Army is making good progress, but will have to expand further. The police are some way behind, but even there we are seeing that good leaders can really make a difference. I wouldn't want to put a figure on how long it will be before the Afghan National Army takes on the lead for security across the whole of the country, but I judge it will happen progressively over a relatively small number of years.

"Meanwhile, we have to hold the ring. Are we able to? Well, I think that our people have answered this in no uncertain terms. Their determination, their professionalism and their undaunted courage have led to significant achievements in Helmand. Judging progress is always a challenge, because it depends on which way you look. If you face back to where we started in 2006, it's clear that we've come a long way. But if you turn and look towards where we're headed, Afghanistan as a country still has so far to go that it can seem as if we've come little distance at all. That, however, is a refection of the scale of the enterprise, rather than a measure of progress.

"What about resources? We certainly require more boots on the ground, but they really need to be Afghan boots. The extent to which NATO nations might have to do more in the interim is something that the new ISAF commander, General McChrystal, is reviewing. But in terms of numbers, it is the Afghans who are of strategic importance in the longer term, not NATO.

"Equipment is a subject that has generated much debate, some of it well informed, some of it not. The starting point is that our equipment is good and increasingly improving; commanders in the field speak of it very highly. But the other side of the coin is that it will never be good enough. In any military campaign, there always has been and always will be a gap between the equipment we would like to have and what we can actually field at any given moment.

"There are many reasons for this, but one of the most important is that the enemy gets a vote. They adapt their tactics and techniques to counter our capabilities, so what is 'the right equipment' in a campaign changes over time, and often very quickly. Some of the items of equipment we're working to replace today were thought by our people to be 'right' when we deployed to Helmand - and so they were. But not any longer. Unfortunately, it takes time to research, design and manufacture new equipment, to train our people on it, and to get it into the field.

"We will always face this lag between identifying a requirement and providing a solution. This is not to claim that we haven't made mistakes; they are, to a degree, inevitable in any human endeavour. But enormous and continuous effort goes into providing our people with the appropriate equipment to carry out their difficult and dangerous tasks.

"So returning to my three questions, I believe that what we're doing in Afghanistan is of strategic importance to the UK; I believe that, although very difficult, it is doable; and I believe that the strategy is the right one, although I think that General McChrystal will have some important things to say about what is required to implement the strategy effectively. But I do not think the outcome in Afghanistan is a foregone conclusion - either way. I see two major threats to our strategic success.

"The first is national and international will: do we have the determination, staying power and strategic patience to see through such a long term endeavour in the face of the short term vagaries of tactical fortune?

"The second is Afghan delivery. We can only hold the ring for so long; following the elections, early Afghan progress on things like security sector reform, rule of law, economic development and reintegration of reformed insurgents - all critical to governance - is essential.

"The young men and women of our military are doing their part. They are withstanding hardship, danger and loss with remarkable fortitude and steadfast determination. They look to us to seize the opportunities they've created; to deliver on the issues of will, commitment and Afghan political progress that are now crucial to success. We owe them and their families no less."